

## PCNA Review: Phase One

### Iraq Needs Assessment

#### Case Study

---

---

#### Reader's Guide

This case study was prepared in July 2006 by a joint team from the UN Development Group Office and the World Bank as part of Phase One of the PCNA Review conducted in 2006. The Post Conflict Needs Assessment is increasingly used as the platform for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning, and the 2006 PCNA Review is a joint effort by the UN and the Bank to capture lessons from past experience and introduce innovations and guidance that support improved and more effective PCNAs. Case studies are available for PCNAs done in Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia; in addition, two case studies for countries whose assessments predated the current PCNA “methodology” are also available (East Timor and Afghanistan).

The objective of the case study is to present a “snapshot” of the post-conflict needs assessment done in Iraq in 2003, documenting what happened and, to the extent available, the lessons learned during the assessment. This descriptive case study is based primarily on written materials that documented the preparations for, process of, and products from the Iraq assessment; additional information was solicited from participants in e-mail and interviews.

This case study is written to serve the needs of many audiences, ranging from those who have no background in or knowledge of PCNAs to country experts who may even have participated in the assessment itself:

<b>if you are interested in . . .</b>	<b>refer to –</b>
the national context in which the assessment was situated	Section I
the process of the needs assessment – who participated, how it was organized and conducted, who paid for it, what documents were produced, and what resources it mobilized	Section II
inclusion of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environment, or security	Section III
attention to issues of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity in the process and products of the PCNA	Section III
the legacy of the PCNA – financing, implementation, coordination, and monitoring of subsequent programming	Section IV
unique circumstances and lessons that PCNA participants identified	Section V

Phase Two of the PCNA Review investigates key questions under five themes to provide refined guidance and revised PCNA tools: strategic and programmatic aspects; operational mechanisms; state-building; peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity; security-development nexus. Phase Two ends in November 2006.

---

---

## **I. National context**

Three wars over two decades, the rule of a divisive dictatorial regime, widespread violation of human rights, a dilapidation of infrastructure and a severe erosion of the economic base and social services – all have had a devastating impact on Iraq’s people. Years of war reparations, sanctions, and Iraq’s large external debt diverted scarce financial and human resources away from development. Many regions with rich potential for mineral exploitation and agricultural production were not able to feed its inhabitants adequately - 16 million people or 60% of the population were reliant upon public distribution support in varying degrees for daily subsistence.<sup>1</sup>

The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of Saddam Hussein regime resulted in robust insurgencies, and although the occupation officially ended in June 2004, violence continues and limits the international community’s ability to operate effectively in Iraq.

Brief timeline of events	
20 March to 1 May 2003	Military attack on Iraq from by US/UK
22 March 2003	Security Council Resolution 1483 is passed
9 April 2003	Creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to lead Iraq until Iraqi government/national sovereignty is restored
1 May 2003	President Bush declares end of hostilities
13 July 2003	Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) is established by the CPA
11 August 2003	IGC establishes a Constitutional Preparatory Commission to look at procedural issues related to the constitutional process
14 August 2003	Security Council approves Resolution 1500 authorizing the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
19 August 2003	Bombing of the UN Compound
1 September 2003	UNAMI is established
Week of 21 September 2003	The JNA is presented in Dubai
23-24 October 2003	Donor Reconstruction Conference in Madrid
21 November 2003	Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) is closed
1 June 2004	Interim Iraqi Government is established
28 June 2004	CPA hands over to full-term Iraqi Government

## **II. Process**

### **Origins and Substantive Purpose**

The World Bank, in consultation with the US/CPA, planned to undertake a post-conflict needs assessment following the end of the hostilities. The needs assessment was meant to identify medium-longer term reconstruction needs, including urgent recovery needs for 2004 and indicative reconstruction needs for 2005-2007, which would be financed from the Iraqi national budget. The UNDG Agencies were operating on the ground throughout the country, and had garnered substantial experience and baseline data. The Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) Core Group had been sending teams to do humanitarian needs assessments and the UN (UNICEF and UNDP) and the World Bank had joint ‘Watching Briefs’ that were used to collect economic and other data on the emerging situation in advance of an operational presence. At the time, the World Bank did not have a presence in Iraq. Therefore, the UNDG was invited to become part of the needs assessment exercise, thus initiating the first joint UNDG/World Bank post-conflict needs assessment (the JNA).

---

<sup>1</sup> Letter from DSRSG/RC/HC for Iraq (UNAMIL, 6 September 2005)

The purpose of the JNA was to inform the donor conference of the current status and priority reconstruction and rehabilitation needs in each sector, focusing on the most urgent needs and budgetary requirements for 2004 and indicative reconstruction needs for the period 2005-2007. Requirements would be further assessed to fulfill remaining gaps and improve overall data quality over time; in addition, significant priority sectors that fell outside of the JNA's remit – such as security and oil – would need to be considered.

At the request of the Deputy Secretary-General, the UNDG began preparing for the needs assessment by launching the Technical Working Group on Planning for Reconstruction Needs Assessment in Iraq on 16 May 2003. In order to define the methodology and scope of work, the Technical Working Group looked at the model of Afghanistan Needs Assessment (which was led by the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and UNDP on behalf of the UNDG and later elaborated by the UNDG, ECHA and the IASC into an Interim Transitional Assistance Plan, or an ITAP.) A draft list of 14 priority sectors was compiled by a core coordination team from the UNDG and the World Bank, which was largely finalized at technical meetings held in June.

Fourteen priority sectors:

1. Education: Primary, Secondary & Higher Education
2. Health
3. Agriculture & Water Resources
4. Mine Action
5. Water, Sanitation, Solid Waste
6. Investment Climate
7. State-owned Enterprises
8. Financial Sector
9. Transport and Telecommunications
10. Electricity
11. Employment Housing & Land Management
12. Urban Management
13. Government Institutions, Civil Society, Rule of Law, Media

Three cross-cutting themes:

1. Human Rights
2. Gender
3. Environment

To coordinate the technical process, a Senior Technical Coordinator was seconded by UNICEF in mid-May 2003 after informal discussions among UNDG Agencies. The UNDG Agencies and World Bank divided up lead agency responsibilities for the various sectors and proposed candidates to be Task Managers later that month. The core coordination team reviewed Agency and donor technical experts' professional qualifications and finalized the leadership of the Sectors in mid-June and participation of donors a month later.

Technical consultations were held on 24 June 2003 organized by the UNDG with the World Bank, IMF, CPA, donors, NGOs and humanitarian organizations on the proposed priority sectors and cross-cutting themes. It was agreed that a Donor Core Group and a wider Liaison Group would be established. There was also a political agreement on the need for a donor conference and a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF.) Despite the lack of a sovereign government, the Joint UN/WB Needs Assessment, or JNA, was launched.

The Iraq JNA was based on the following principles:

- \* Quantifying the budgetary needs within each sector for 2004 while giving priority to Iraqi participation and ownership;

- \* The establishment of the necessary policy and regulatory framework;
- \* Focus on institutional needs;
- \* The reconstruction or expansion of essential social infrastructure and services;
- \* The protection of the vulnerable during the transition phase ;
- \* The immediate creation of employment opportunities; and
- \* Humanitarian assistance requirements that may exist beyond the duration of the revised humanitarian appeal.<sup>2</sup>

Following the consultations in June, the appointed Task Managers performed a comprehensive desk review, followed by short, inter-agency rolling assessments missions to Iraq between mid-July and mid-August. It was envisaged that Iraqi nationals would be involved as much as possible due to their high technical capacities and to foster national ownership, though the security situation did not allow for their full engagement. In addition to security constraints, the ongoing de-Baathification policy rendered the vast majority of qualified civil servants ineligible for government service, which had a critical impact on the sovereignty of the needs assessment exercise.

Despite the bombing of the UN compound at the Canal Hotel on 19 August 2003, the sector reports were completed and circulated on 31 August 2003. A team of five staff from UNDP and two from the World Bank met in Washington in early September to analyze the reports and draft the synthesis report. The findings of the JNA synthesis report were presented to national and international stakeholders in Dubai during the week of 21 September 2003 and to the Donor Core Group on 2 October 2003 in Madrid. The Donor Conference on Reconstruction in Iraq was then held on 23 and 24 October 2003 in Madrid.

It should be noted that the figures presented to the donor conference largely covered physical reconstruction, technical assistance and training needs, plus additional operational and maintenance costs associated with new investments, but excluded recurrent costs as that was meant to be provided for in the Iraqi budget. While the figures represented the best estimates of likely needs for the medium-term, the actual disbursements of funds was harder to predict due to the security situation, absorption capacity and the state of infrastructure. As a result, arriving at an agreed formula at the sector level and agreeing on a holistic figure to present to the community was difficult.

The Technical Working Group, the chief organizer of the needs assessment, was supported by DGO through a temporary secretariat under the direction of the Senior Technical Coordinator. Information was shared through the Technical Working Group and via a DGO-managed website. The Senior Technical Coordinator drafted the methodology for the assessment (based loosely on that of the Afghan ITAP) as well as an outline for the sector reports, though the Task Managers were given the flexibility to adapt their reports according to their own sector's context. DGO provided funds for the Secretariat; while UNICEF seconded the Senior Technical Coordinator.

#### *Linkage to other processes and strategies*

Humanitarian: The Oil for Food Programme (OFFP) was gradually phased out and finally closed on 21 November 2003. Liquid assets were handed-over to the CPA-managed Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) on 28 May 2003.<sup>3</sup> The Flash Appeal, launched on 28 March 2003, primarily covered emergency relief and infrastructure repair vital to the humanitarian response for 2003. The Appeal was revised on 3 June 2003 to identify outstanding humanitarian needs. The needs assessment did not include urgent humanitarian needs.

---

<sup>2</sup> Presentation on Needs Assessment in Iraq for International Liaison Group (DGO, 6 August 2003)

<sup>3</sup> LG Meeting Minutes (DGO, 26 August 2003)

Political: Although the UNDG Agencies were not involved in the discussions regarding UNAMI's mandate or composition, meetings were held in Cyprus between the UN Country Team, the UNDG, DPA and DPKO on the evolving role of the UN in Iraq's reconstruction following the donor conference.

### **Participation of Key Actors**

There were a number of challenges related to the consultation of stakeholders in the JNA. First, the JNA took place in the absence of a sovereign government, which severely constrained the ownership of the process. In addition, once Iraqi officials and members of the emerging governing structures were nominated (in September), there was little opportunity to participate in or shape the recommendations of the JNA as it was largely finalized.

Second, the security situation reduced overall opportunities for local and national participation, which had a negative impact on the ownership of the final document. Sectoral teams consulted with respective ministries to generate information to the extent possible (though the report was not translated into Arabic before being finalized.) Some sectors organized stakeholders' workshops (ex. Health) but the process did not allow sufficient time to discuss critical issues at length, and was ultimately interrupted due to the bombing of the UN premise in Baghdad.

However, regular briefings were held on the ground for NGOs and donors. NGOs were not invited to participate in the technical assessments<sup>4</sup>, yet donors insisted the World Bank and UNDG Agencies allow their technical experts to participate.

In addition, the DGO web site was crucial for communications and information exchange between the JNA teams, the Donor Core Group, the Technical Working Group and other interested stakeholders with access to the internet.

### **Coordination and Institutional Support**

In Baghdad, the technical assessments were coordinated under the overall leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and under the immediate direction of the Deputy SRSG also acting as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Resident Coordinator (RC), supported by the UN Country Team (UNCT), a Coordination Support Officer, a Senior Strategic Planner and support staff. The Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (OHCI) played a critical role in coordinating the assessments of the teams once on the ground, and acted as an interlocutor between national stakeholders, the CPA, NGOs and donors present in Iraq. In addition, the OHCI organized stakeholders' consultations, though as noted earlier, most were either aborted due to the bombing or held outside of Iraq where few national stakeholders were present.

The Technical Working Group, based in NY, served as a platform for information exchange on the conceptual work on the overall framework of the JNA and the sector needs assessments as well as a forum for monitoring progress. The Technical Working Group consisted of: DGO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, UNIFEM, UN Habitat, UNODC, WHO, OHCHR, IFAD, UNCTAD, UNESCO, FAO, UNIDO, ILO, UNEP, UNHCR, OCHA, DPA, DPI, DSG's Office, UNOPS, UNAIDS, OIP, IOM, ITU, Office of the Special Advisor on Iraq, Office of the Special Advisor on Women, WB and IMF (DGO acted as Secretariat.)

The DGO Secretariat was responsible for facilitating the information exchange, managing the web site, collecting and posting data, background documents and sector reports, as well as regular liaison with the UN Country Team, the World Bank, the technical assessment teams and Task Managers and donors. The Secretariat was staffed with the Senior Technical Coordinator, Policy

---

<sup>4</sup> GTZ Working Paper No. 4 Needs Assessment in Post-Conflict Situations, Case Study Iraq (GTZ, November 2003)

Specialists (1 full, 1 part-time) and support staff. Later, UNDP policy and programme staff joined to assist in drafting the synthesis report.

The Donor Core Group was established in Washington DC as a steering committee, and sponsored and hosted the Donor Reconstruction Conference. Participants included: the US, Japan, Spain, the EU/EC and United Arab Emirates; the UN and WB acted as observers (WB acted as Secretariat.)

The Liaison Group also served as an entity for information exchange among a wider group of donors and NGOs. 52 UN Member States, a number of IFIs, UN organizations and NGOs participated in the LG, which was chaired by the UNDG (DGO acted as Secretariat.)

### **Financing of the PCNA**

Although a budget was not prepared prior to the start of the JNA, DGO used its own funds to establish the Secretariat and to recruit coordination support staff in Iraq. UNICEF also seconded the Senior Technical Coordinator without delay. The UNDG Agencies and the World Bank funded their own staff and consultants' participation in the JNA from their own budgets. Japan funded the technical consultations held in June 2003.

DGO estimates that the costs of the JNA were approximately \$170,559.94, which includes \$20,005.84 for UNDG travel to the Donor Conference.<sup>5</sup> (This figure excludes UNDG and World Bank staff time.)

### **Donor Conference**

The Madrid Donor Conference, held on 23-24 October 2003, was organized by the Donor Core Group with logistical support from DGO and UNDP. Prior to the conference, the Donor Core Group met in Brussels on 3 September 2003 and the Liaison Group met on 5 September 2003 to discuss the planning of the conference. Arrangements were finalized through a series of conference calls in which the UNDG and the World Bank participated. Both the Liaison Group and Donor Core Group agreed on the conference's goals: to build political support and secure pledges, agree on reconstruction priorities, link reconstruction needs to review of humanitarian needs, and discuss the MDTF and the liaison between the MDTF and the DFI.<sup>6</sup> The Donor Core Group set the agenda and decided who would host the conference, where it would be held and when. Spain organized and funded the conference. A number of IFIs and Arab organizations participated in the Liaison Group and attended the donor conference.

The UN Country Team had no involvement in the planning of the conference; discussions were limited to regular tele-conferences with the UNDP Representative and his team and some members of UNAMI. (The UNCT as such was much less structured than it is now as many agencies were not present in Baghdad at the time.)

The JNA requested \$35.819b. At the Madrid Conference, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to Iraq's reconstruction with pledges of \$33b. The donors also agreed on the need for a MDTF. According to the Iraq Trust Fund website, as of January 2006, the IRFFI received \$1.4b.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Final Budget Iraq Needs Assessment (DGO, February 2004)

<sup>6</sup> Donor Core Group Meeting Minutes (DGO, 10 July, 24 July, 31 July, 5 August, 3 September, 11 September, 30 October 2003)

<sup>7</sup> [www.irffi.org](http://www.irffi.org) 19 June 2006

### **III. Substance and Key Issues**

#### **Geographic considerations**

*Kurdish provinces:* The deterioration of various economic and social systems as indicated in the needs assessment underscores the high variability among the different regions in Iraq. This is a result of the politicization of budget allocations and service provision by the Ba'ath regime of the past three decades, as well as the relative autonomy by the three Kurdish provinces in northern Iraq over the past decade. This has resulted in significant socio-economic differences between the North and the South, as well as between urban and rural areas.

In addition to operating autonomously, the administrations in the North were not subject to direct physical conflict-related destruction. These administrations have operated with relative effectiveness and efficiency; significant reconstruction initiatives have been undertaken, in part due to the strong civil society organizations and political parties present.

#### **Cross-cutting issues**

The UN and World Bank teams covered four cross-cutting themes – gender, human rights, environmental issues, capacity analysis. In addition to screening the sectoral teams' drafts, the cross-cutting experts prepared one-page synthesis papers on cross cutting issues focusing on key actions for 2004 – however, in the final report the sectoral chapters make very little reference to cross-cutting issues.

The CPA provided cost estimates for the following sectors: security and police; oil; culture; environment; human rights; foreign affairs; religious affairs; science and technology; youth and sport.

***Environment as a cross-cutting theme.*** Although UNEP had intended to establish an in-country presence to support the consideration of environment as a cross-cutting issue for the duration of the PCNA, this was not possible after the August 2003 UN evacuation. As Iraq was the first PCNA for UNEP, no clear environmental assessment method had been established and a great deal of time was spent becoming familiar with the process. This was complicated by insufficient communication within the cluster system, making it difficult to obtain information. The lack of proper communication between clusters also resulted in misunderstandings about each others' scope of work, as illustrated by the issue of waste management, which was only addressed at a very late stage. UNEP contacted sectoral managers and furnished them with checklists of environmental issues, however, these were not effective in eliciting responses, partly because they were not tailored enough to the aims of the PCNA. UNEP undertook to review the various clusters' reports, but these were received very late in the process – many only 48 hours before the deadline. Nevertheless, UNEP experts reviewed the reports and provided comments to the clusters. Consultation with government officials took place on an inconsistent basis, with security conditions greatly hindering the consultation process.

***Gender as a cross-cutting theme.*** UNIFEM's gender advisor worked from HQ and the UNIFEM office in Amman coordinated with the cluster teams in the field; the advisor attended the UNDG coordination meetings and worked with other gender advisors in UN and NGO agencies to modify a gender checklist to make it shorter and easier to digest quickly. They also developed a gender-sensitive Iraq country profile, a list of key contacts in Iraq, and a bibliography. At one point the UNIFEM-Amman office also contracted consultants to produce sector-specific gender analyses to be used by the team, but the gender advisor did not see those until after the process had ended. All tools were available through the cluster managers and on the website for the needs assessment. Because the process was disrupted due to insecurity, not as much was absorbed by

cluster teams as could have been done; some of the sectors had good gender analysis (in particular, governance), but UNIFEM would have liked more explicit highlighting issues of women's human rights and women's empowerment. They were not able to "cost" out those actions and so there was no budget available at the end of the day.

**Synthesis report.** The final report contains one chapter dedicated to gender, human rights and environment. It contains a short assessment of the status quo in all three areas, and then identifies the relevant Iraqi counterparts and some concrete immediate measures for enhancing the institutional and legal framework to deal with these issues as well as to improve services. The gender team was not involved in formulating or reviewing any of the matrices. Although the reports mention issue-specific counterparts and measures, which do not fall under the other fourteen sectors, no special budget is earmarked to support activities in these areas.

Checklists on gender, environment, and human rights were provided by experts to sector teams but there was little time to familiarize Task Managers with the material in detail.

While drafting the synthesis report from team inputs, a special effort was made to integrate the cross-cutting themes into the sectoral analysis, though UNEP felt that their inputs, including their detailed costing, were not well reflected in the synthesis reports, and as a result were not taken up in the UN work plan. In addition, the sectoral reports were screened for any omissions and inconsistencies, which were discussed with Task Managers.

### **Conflict sensitivity and peace-building**

Socio-political and security issues were left almost entirely out of the analysis per the request of the CPA. Security, however, was identified as an impediment to action in the field. (See below.) Peacebuilding is very narrowly conceived in terms of livelihoods actions and includes an emphasis on social safety nets, but without deliverables.

### **State-building**

As noted above, the JNA took place in the absence of a sovereign government, and in this circumstance it is perhaps not surprising that no explicit definition of state-building or of the core state functions to be performed was included. The very short timeline, in addition to the security situation, also constrained the involvement of national stakeholders who might have contributed state-building perspectives to the process; stakeholder consultations were also affected by the bombing of the UN compound.

Capacity building, on the other hand, was highlighted as a key priority and selected as one of the cross-cutting issues, but the JNA provided few detailed recommendations on how to achieve this goal. The cluster reports only included limited consideration about utilization of existing national capabilities or gradual increase of national ownership. The main focus was on securing immediate service delivery and the development of a market economy.

Prioritization of activities was only included at a very general level.

### **Security sector considerations**

The CPA specifically asked that the needs assessment exclude "strategic sectors" which covered both security and oil, and wanted the assessment to establish figures for the 2004 budget rather than looking at long-term needs. The synthesis report did identify security as key challenge to rebuilding Iraq, but did not address root causes or drivers (new or old) of the conflict. Mine action was the only issue related to security sector reform to be covered by the JNA

In discussing absorptive capacity and probable disbursement rates, the report notes that several factors are regarded as key bottlenecks to rapid reconstruction, first of which is the security

situation “inhibiting the free movement of international and local agencies as well as of local people.”

GTZ noted in its lessons learned document that “the report makes clear that the assessment team considers security to be biggest challenge – yet it fall outside the scope of the needs assessment.”

#### **IV. Post-PCNA Implementation and Financing of the TRM**

There was no single overall national strategy following the donor conference. On the UN side, UNAMI and the UN Country Team held a series of strategic planning workshops in November 2003. (A Strategic Planner was recruited by DGO to facilitate.) The process moved forward with the arrival of senior UN leaders, particularly the DSRSG in late November 2003.

In January/February 2004, the 14 priority sectors were re-grouped into 11 ‘clusters’ and five cross-cutting themes for the purpose of joint planning, programming and implementation. The ‘Cluster’ model was loosely based on the Afghan ITAP and was meant to better organize and coordinate the work of the UN Country Team as well as to facilitate access to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI.) The Clusters were ultimately elaborated into a UN Strategic Plan as priorities were evolving and the UN needed clear direction on how to support reconstruction.

These planning meetings were held in Amman and Nicosia, which made it difficult for national staff to participate, and for the UN Country Team to understand the real nature and implication of the security issues and other factors. However, a limited number of government interlocutors were able to participate.

Different coordination committees were set up later on to facilitate and streamline processes. The Cluster Group Peer Review ensured projects were in line with the Cluster Approach and UN Strategic Plan. The Steering Committee, led by the DSRSG, reviewed and recommended projects to IRFFI. The Steering Committee Support Office and UNAMI Programme Support Office facilitated the flow of projects. Finally, the IRFFI Secretariat ensured projects were funded in a timely manner.<sup>8</sup>

In early 2006, the UN Country Team established small working groups to review existing structures, processes and cross-cutting themes, and in particular, how the governance mechanisms were functioning and the membership.

With regards to the financing, UNDP and the World Bank drafted a Terms of Reference for the proposed IRFFI, which was unveiled to the donors on 11 December 2003. The IRFFI was based on the model of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but adapted to incorporate appropriate windows for Iraq’s reconstruction needs and relevant coordination mechanisms. The IRFFI has two windows: the World Bank Trust Fund and the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund managed by UNDP. An MDTF Unit was established in UNDP HQ in January 2004, and the first disbursement was made in July 2004.

Most of the projects linked to the UN Strategic Plan were funded by the UNDG-ITF, thus the UNCT was bound by the terms of the agreements between UNDP as Administrative Agent and UN Agencies accessing the fund. Essentially the Memorandum of Understanding between the UNDG-ITF, or UNDP as the Administrative Agent of the ITF, stipulates that UNDP as Administrative Agent would take the lead in monitoring and evaluation. As such, UNDP monitors expenditure, but not necessarily the impact and realization of outcomes, which is difficult due to security conditions and current ceilings on staffing inside Iraq.

---

<sup>8</sup> UNCT Iraq Cluster Approach Lessons Learned (UNAMI/UNDG, November 2004)

The first version of the UN Strategic Plan for 2005-2007 was linked to the JNA, however, there have been three subsequent versions to make it a relevant and living document in light of the deteriorating security situation. The document has also changed as Iraqi priorities have changed, and most recently has been aligned to the Iraqi National Development Plan.

The IRFFI supports the activities as laid out in the JNA and follows four guiding principles. First, each program or project approved for funding is part of a priority program validated by the Iraqi Authorities, based on the JNA and formulated in consultation with donors and other partners. However, some Agencies felt that the basis for approval or disapproval of projects was not always clear. Second, to the extent possible, activities financed by the Facility are implemented by the Iraqi ministries, or through Iraqi civil society organizations. Iraqi ownership and leadership is a paramount principle of the IRFFI in order to develop sustainable local capacity. Third, the IRFFI is meant to promote transparency and accountability, efficiency and prompt delivery, and support progressive development of a unified budget and coherent public expenditure process. Lastly, donor coordination is essential in avoiding the emergence of gaps, duplication in funding, and in ensuring consistent policy advice and sustained budget expenditure planning.

In addition, the UNDG-TF Fund also funds activities in mine action, cultural heritage, and drugs and crime control. Neither the UN nor the World Bank Trust Fund covers humanitarian activities or security.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Support/guidance to post-PCNA follow-up*

DGO provided guidance by sharing strategies from other post-conflict countries and the Guidance Note on Joint Programming. DGO also played a key role in updating the UNDG Agencies on the developments. Though DGO originally suggested that the Strategic Plan be based on the UNDAF matrix, the use of the Cluster Approach and Matrix was fully supported after the Director of DGO came to Amman in December 2003 to lead a country team workshop that gave place to this new direction.

### **V. Unique Circumstances and Participants' Reflections on Lessons Learned**

The JNA took place under exceptionally difficult political circumstances and significant time constraints. Future political and military development were difficult to foresee, no legitimate or functioning national authority was involved until after the sector assessments took place and reports were drafted, and the role of the CPA (Occupying Forces) was highly politicized. Coupled with this was the contentious issue of the UN's mandate. It was also felt that the outcomes of the findings were highly influenced by political agendas of donors.

The bombing of the UN compound interrupted the process and shifted the focus of the international community. Furthermore, insecurity disallowed opportunity for stakeholders' consultation and field visits, and as a result, impacted the national ownership of the JNA and its findings. There was a lack of primary sources, since limited missions outside of Baghdad restricted validation of newly collected data.

Limited interaction between sectoral teams led to contradictory recommendations. However, the DGO Secretariat facilitated more prompt information-sharing and a forum for discussing policy or technical issues.

There were also unique characteristics following the JNA. The Cluster Approach was an innovative way for the UN to address some of the reconstruction priorities based on the UN's comparative advantage. However, the security situation rapidly deteriorated, forcing the UN to operate in emergency mode and dramatically scale back staff. Accordingly, it became difficult to

---

<sup>9</sup> LG Minutes (DGO, December 11, 2003)

monitor the implementation of activities; most were carried out by national staff who did not want to be openly associated with the UN for fear of harm.

The IRFFI was an innovative tool created by the World Bank and the UN to help donors channel their resources to the Iraq reconstruction effort. The Facility has ensured swift, flexible, and coordinated donor financing for priority investments in Iraq. So far 25 donors have committed approximately \$1.4b to the Facility, which has enhanced support to Iraq's recovery and fortified the partnership between the international community and the Iraqi authorities.

## **VI. Resources used and key informants**

- \* PCNA Roundtable Summary for the UNDG TWG (DGO, 1 December 2005)
- \* UN/WB Roundtable Report on PCNAs (DGO, 2 December 2005)
- \* JNA Synthesis Report (UN/WB October 2003)
- \* Working Paper No. 4 Needs Assessment in Post-Conflict Situations, Case Study Iraq (GTZ, November 2003)
- \* Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations (UNDG/WB/UNDP, August 2004)
- \* UNCT Iraq Cluster Approach Lessons Learned (UNAMI/UNDG, November 2004)
- \* Letter from DSRSG/RC/HC for Iraq, 6 September 2005
- \* Technical Working Group Meeting Minutes (16 May, 28 May, 10 July, 24 July, 30 July, 14 August, 27 August 2003, DGO)
- \* Technical Consultations Note for the Record (24 June 2003, DGO)
- \* DCG Meetings Minutes (10 July, 24 July, 31 July, 5 August, 3 September, 11 September, 30 October 2003, DGO)
- \* LG Meeting Minutes (25 July, 26 August, 5 September, 14 October, 11 December 2003, DGO)
- \* Key informant interviews with staff in UNAMI, UNDP Iraq, former OHCI and former OCHA Iraq offices, UNICEF NY & DGO