The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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The International Organization for Migration Iraq Mission

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In light of the necessity for continual assessment of the on-going IDP situation in Iraq, and acknowledging the importance of informed and targeted assistance to those most affected, IOM Iraq would like to thank the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) for their continued support. IOM Iraq also expresses its gratitude to Brookings Institution for their assistance and review. And of course, many thanks go to IOM Iraq’s Rapid Assessment and Response Team members for their tireless work in collecting the data and information, often in very difficult circumstances, which constitutes the basis of this work.
This study was finalized at the end of the summer of 2014, while hostilities and violence were on the rise in Iraq. Fighting originally broke out in the Governorate of Anbar in late 2013 and then spread into central and northern Iraq, adding further elements to an already multilayered situation of internal displacement and more complexity to what was first called the “new displacement”. While the relative calm from 2008 to 2012 had allowed IOM and other humanitarian partners to provide assistance and relief combined with development and capacity-building support, the onset of new displacement in 2013 and its huge growth in 2014 has taken the humanitarian community back to a massive emergency modus and forced IOM and humanitarian partners to re-concentrate on the provision of urgently needed relief. Simultaneously, we have continued our crucial community revitalization projects, socioeconomic integration assistance and livelihood creation across secure regions of Iraq.

At all times, IOM’s focus on the collection, analysis and dissemination of timely and accurate internally displaced persons (IDP) data remains paramount. Since 2003, IOM has been in a unique position to provide reliable updates on trends and locations of displaced populations in Iraq and their conditions in different corners of the country. This task is shouldered by our nationwide network of Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RART), responsible for monitoring displacement through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), IOM’s own highly adaptable IDP monitoring tool that has been used in more than 30 countries. Through DTM, Iraqi RART personnel have provided the Government of Iraq (GoI), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the entire international humanitarian community with regularly updated data on the composition and whereabouts of the IDP population and its most urgent needs for assistance and support. Deployed in each Governorate of Iraq, RART personnel also have been instrumental in organizing and delivering emergency support. IOM’s RART personnel conducted the field survey for this study in April and May 2014, just days before the fall of Mosul. Since then, violence continues to escalate.

The insights of this research must now be observed within the context of the rapidly changing dynamics of the current crisis as well as within the broader historical framework of conflict and displacement in Iraq. This study has enabled us to better understand conditions of displacement at a regional level, and therefore inform a more targeted response for IOM and the entire UN Country Team for each unique region of Iraq as well as for the country as a whole.

Thomas Lothar Weiss
Director - Chief of Mission
IOM Iraq
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The subjects of this study are the displacement trends, living conditions, vulnerabilities and the immediate, mid- and longer term needs of those displaced in Iraq during 2013 and 2014. Substantiated by data from household questionnaires conducted in April and May 2014 at the height of the Anbar crisis, information from IOM’s DTM that has recorded the most recent displacements as well as qualitative studies conducted by the Rapid Assessment and Response Team, this study addresses the situation prevailing for IDPs in what has become a massive humanitarian emergency and will certainly remain a prolonged crisis requiring extensive, long-term international commitment to assistance and stabilization projects in Iraq.

In 2013, nearly 10,000 individuals in Iraq were internally displaced, many being members of minority groups or targeted for tribal or sectarian reasons. In 2014 to date over 1.7 million people have been displaced, the largest number since 2006, when the country was ravaged by sectarian conflict. Again, many of those displaced since June belong to minority groups. Throughout the early months of 2014, IDPs largely originated from the Anbar Governorate where the violence began; however, after the June takeover of Mosul by extremist groups and the subsequent siege of the Sinjar district in north-eastern Ninawa Governorate, the crisis spread into the heart of Iraq; displacement has been occurring to and from all corners of the country, stretching the capacity of the Iraqi Government and humanitarian response organizations to their very limits.

Adding new displacement to that of Iraq’s long history of large-scale displacement, estimates of total IDPs in Iraq now surpass three million. While fast solutions to prolonged internal displacement remain elusive, in-depth studies of these problems allow humanitarian response bodies, IOM as well as the entire United Nations Country Team in Iraq, to anticipate the needs of the most recently displaced.

The vast majority of the 1,467 displaced families sampled in 2014 were from Anbar Governorate; however, Ninawa Governorate has since become the area of origin for the largest number in 2014. While the majority of IDPs from Anbar were displaced to other areas within Anbar, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Baghdad were also very frequent destinations. In the south, most IDPs were located in Najaf. Since June, both the KRI and Najaf have experienced massive influxes in IDPs, many of whom are living in particularly unsustainable conditions such as abandoned buildings, schools and religious buildings and are particularly subject to secondary displacement. This phenomenon, an indicator of increased vulnerability, was already happening in the KRI as early as April, when IDPs were no longer able to afford the cost of local rents and moved southward into Kirkuk. Secondary and even tertiary displacements indicate increased vulnerability, as they show how displacement conditions have become unsustainable, often due to concerns over personal safety, financial difficulties or as a result of forced evictions.

Though good security was stated by 93 per cent of all IDPs as a reason for choosing their current area of displacement, secondary pull factors showed regional variances: for IDPs who were settled in the KRI, access to accommodation was the second most common pull factor, while in the central and central-northern governorates, the presence of family and friends was more important. In Anbar, after security, the presence of family and friends and proximity to former residences strongly influenced an IDP’s decision to remain within the Governorate.

Rented accommodation was the most common form of housing for new IDPs outside Anbar and has remained so for those displaced throughout the summer of 2014; however, this was far more common in the KRI where 88 per cent of IDPs were renting houses. These families were commonly exhausting their savings to pay rent and ultimately considered renting homes unsustainable, therefore becoming vulnerable to secondary displacement. In the central and central-northern governorates, rented housing was still the most common, but significant populations were also living with host families. Living with host families was
by far the most common form of accommodation in both Anbar and the southern governorates. The sample also captured a substantial number of families living in highly unsustainable or non-durable living conditions, such as informal settlements and public spaces, a phenomenon that is now overwhelming the KRI.

Many IDPs reported insufficient access to food in their area of displacement and that reducing food intake was their primary way to cut spending, endangering their own nutrition and that of their children. The most important form of food aid was coming from the host community and, if IDPs were being accommodated with host families, from these families. While some reported receiving aid from either local or relief services, it was insufficient to meet the great need of the large IDP population. In view of the enormous strain of large scale displacement on both IDPs and host communities currently prevalent in Iraq, host communities will struggle to accommodate these populations.

The survey also revealed that only half of IDP households could receive health care and that they commonly went without necessary medicine or health procedures as a coping mechanism. Even in places where IDPs reported health care services were accessible, these often lacked equipment, staff and medicine, especially in areas like Anbar where violence is commonplace and thoroughfares have been closed. This is especially alarming because the most frequently reported vulnerability was untreated chronic illness: more than a quarter of all households reported that at least one family member was affected.

Nearly two thirds of IDP children were not attending school, due to barriers such as distance between home and school, lack of proper documentation from their former schools, area schools being used to shelter IDPs and lack of income to purchase supplies. The KRI reported the lowest figures for school attendance and Arabic-speaking IDP children faced an additional language barrier in Kurdish-speaking schools. These problems will surely persist into the coming school year in the KRI and beyond, especially as government and relief organizations struggle to find sufficient alternative shelters for IDPs living in schools.

IDPs stated that their most pressing needs were, of course, shelter, food, health care and education; however, the most commonly reported priority requirement, both short- and long-term, was employment: if IDPs can secure regular income, they will be able to attain these other needs. Daily paid labour was the most common form of employment in both the area of displacement and of origin, indicating the instability of the Iraqi job market overall; the unemployment rate for IDPs was over 40 per cent. These facts combined highlight the importance of livelihood enhancement and business creation projects for both IDPs and host communities, which have stabilizing effects on IDP families and the entire community.

In the past it has been noted that IDP intentions tend to change over time: whereas IDPs are initially insistent that they return to their areas of origin, they gradually become more receptive to integration; however, prolonged crises undoubtedly include eventual waves of IDPs returning to their areas of origin. The vast majority of IDPs surveyed intend to return to their area of origin at some point when security stabilizes, though members of minority groups were more undecided about their intentions. Security was the major determining factor in whether a family intended to integrate or return, though shared ethno-sectarian makeup and ability to secure employment also influenced this intention.

IOM has redoubled its capacity for emergency response in recent months, maintaining accurate and up-to-the-minute data on the whereabouts, situation and needs of new IDPs and distributing material relief packages to help meet these needs. Additionally, it is continuing its programming for livelihood creation and more long-term developmental solutions, as past research and this report show that this multi-faceted, holistic approach to addressing the problems associated with internal displacement is the only way forward.
The entrenchment of armed opposition groups and continuation of violence in cities across Iraq have led to the consistent growth of internal displacement since the beginning of 2014. The displacement crisis in Iraq is likely to continue generating further immediate and longer-term impacts on the Iraqi socio-economic landscape, the severity and scope of which are difficult to predict. A common sentiment expressed by various interviewees is the probability that, under current conditions, the situation in Iraq will continue to deteriorate. In the short term, IDPs living in all regions of Iraq require comprehensive emergency assistance in food, non-food items, cash, health programming and shelter. Results from field-based research and ongoing DTM results have apprised IOM of priority needs of IDPs across Iraq and will be used to inform the response to be coordinated with local, governorate, Government of Iraq and Kurdish Regional Government stakeholders, as well as UN Humanitarian Country Team partners. Focus group discussions, key informant interviews and ongoing DTM results indicate various cross-sectorial needs, including access to emergency supplies and infrastructure, such as food items, emergency non-food items, including basic hygiene and household goods, adequate shelter facilities including tents and prefabricated housing units, as well as the development of sufficient infrastructural facilities for formal-tented IDP camps and support for IDPs living in informal settlements. Furthermore, as the new school year begins, thousands of IDP children will have no access to their schools, as many are being occupied by IDPs and IDP children often face various barriers to attendance. Consequently, shelter support for IDPs living in schools is particularly needed, as well as the establishment of pop-up schools in areas with high concentrations of IDPs that will assist students in continuing their education.

Many IDPs have had highly traumatizing experiences in their areas of origin and are currently undergoing difficult conditions in the aftermath of displacement. Focus group discussions frequently stated that Iraqis, specifically women, would like basic medical training to enable them to respond to emergencies on their own initiative. Programmes for heavily subsidized or free medication for chronic illness, which was shown to be the largest health-related vulnerability, would benefit both IDPs and Iraqis. Psychosocial support to encourage discussion and promote community cohesion among IDPs and strengthen their relationships with the host community would improve their often harsh displacement environments. The Mission recommends the provision of psychosocial support for traumatized IDPs, to complement essential primary health care services to treat communicable and non-communicable diseases among the IDP and host community populations affected, such as tuberculosis detection, prevention and treatment services, and health awareness-raising campaigns.

Medium to long-term challenges include the inability of displaced individuals to secure sufficient income to provide for their families. The vast majority of IDPs were daily paid labourers in both their areas of origin and displacement, indicating the great need in Iraq not just for income, but for sustainable income: for example, female participants in southern Iraq focus group discussions requested tailoring courses so they could contribute to their families’ income and many men expressed a need for jobs that grant them regular income rather than casual labour. The mass movement of Iraqi IDPs to safe host communities, particularly within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, remain dependent on aid until they can find work; this increases the possibility of exploitation within the workplace, leading to an increasingly compromised local economy and rising living costs. IDPs are employed on wages very often lower than the market rate, representing competition to those Iraqis who are themselves struggling to secure an income or who remain unemployed, leading to instability within the communities affected. It is clear that the level of difficulty faced by communities dealing with the arrival of increasing numbers of IDPs is determined by that community’s existing characteristics. A strong economy and sufficient infrastructure provide a community with greater capacity to cope with employment demands and to support incoming vulnerable families.

In response to these challenges, the Mission advocates for the continuation of livelihood support programmes to facilitate integration through employment generation, job matching and support for the creation of small and micro-businesses, as well as through various types of vocational and on-the-job training. It is highly important that both IDPs intending to remain in host communities and host community members themselves are targeted for these programmes, as past research has indicated that host communities can also be highly vulnerable to unemployment and singling out IDPs for support can cause tension. Individual assistance will only be effective if local markets and
associated infrastructure are supported to cope with increasing demand. To this end, IOM has identified the continuation of community-based development in the form of programmes aimed at strengthening local service infrastructure as crucial features of humanitarian response in Iraq. Such initiatives will not only help to improve access among refugees and returnees to basic services, improving their living conditions, but will also increase the capacity of the local economy to absorb increasing numbers of employees and the small and micro-businesses that will employ them. The provision of sufficient livelihood and community infrastructural assistance in support of a stable local economy, capable of supporting all members of a vulnerable community, whether incoming or receiving, is paramount.

In the longer term, inability to find employment is likely to force many IDP families currently living in rented property out of their homes as they struggle to pay rent. This has and will result in more IDPs living in non-durable shelters, forced to depend on aid. As the crisis continues and the priorities of IDPs change, other issues will need to be addressed, such as the expansion of educational facilities, development of sufficient health care infrastructure and further provision of more durable housing. Iraqi authorities continue to face significant challenges in responding to these growing and diversifying needs while being hindered by escalating security conditions since the onset of violence in January 2014, particularly since the takeover of large portions of the country by armed opposition groups; the international community must come together in support of the people of Iraq.

History has shown that displacement in Iraq is a continual phenomenon that occurs in waves, as deeply rooted sectarian and ethnic tensions lie beneath the surface and foreign interventions have added further complications. Better understanding of phenomena such as the displacement trends of minority groups, the effects of prolonged violence, economic challenges associated with displacement and instability, and the situation for specifically vulnerable populations such as female-headed households will contribute to the development of comprehensive response plans. IOM Iraq, therefore, urges the Government of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government, foreign governments and the humanitarian community to work towards a better understanding of the realities of internal displacement in Iraq, as well as to raise awareness regarding the situation on the ground. IOM will continue to investigate displacement conditions for particular populations within Iraq, such as ethnic and religious minorities, to gain a clearer understanding of how the successive waves of displacement have affected them.

Maintaining continuous, updated records of displacement dynamics in Iraq, as well as IDP needs for shelter support, food assistance, access to services and non-food items is imperative in the present emergency context. The IOM DTM, which has been consistently providing bi-weekly results for publication, enables IOM and the UNCT to maintain the best possible information regarding recent displacement, even during times of highly unstable security. This system is crucial to informing not only IOM, but all cluster partners responding to the immediate and long-term needs of new IDPs. The DTM, which supplies a national displacement profile rapidly and continued, thorough research highlighting specific themes of displacement, will provide the international community with a better understanding of the internal displacement phenomena in Iraq to develop emergency response and post-crisis plans more effectively.

To accomplish life-saving emergency relief goals, IOM Iraq will fully use its existing Supply Chain Management system to implement the strategic pre-positioning of emergency relief materials through long term agreements with domestic suppliers to procure emergency items in local markets. When local markets cannot sustain demand for high-quality and affordable household items and shelter units, the Mission will procure these in international markets. IOM will also continue to develop a comprehensive transportation and tracking system designed to facilitate the safe, orderly and humane transport of individuals and families from areas of ongoing violence within Iraq to final camp and other destinations away from potential harm.

The aforementioned recommendations for the present humanitarian context will be priorities in the coming months, as the Mission will implement a comprehensive package of mutually supporting measures, formulated and strengthened over the last 11 years since its establishment in January 2003. Experience gained over the past decade has enabled IOM to develop an extensive network of staff and infrastructure, facilitate the implementation of a range of emergency assistance, livelihood, capacity-building programmes and contribute to the mitigation of consequences felt throughout Iraq as a result of the mass movement of IDPs fleeing from ongoing waves of violence.
In recent decades Iraqi citizens have been repeatedly forced to leave their homes in search of more secure habitats and new livelihoods. The causes for such displacement have varied from poor security resulting from prolonged armed conflicts, direct targeting and threats towards specific ethnic and religious groups, environmental disasters and economic difficulties.

This study, carried out under the Community Revitalization Programme III and funded by the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), set out to map the demographics, displacement trends, living conditions, livelihoods and vulnerabilities of Iraqi IDPs displaced in 2013 and 2014, covering the factors that led to their displacement, current socio-economic conditions, most pressing needs and migration intentions.

The goal of the research was to raise awareness among humanitarian and government actors of the latest displacements and to provide baseline data for planning for both emergency response and community development-based projects; however, the continued escalation of violence in 2014 has placed the findings in a new context: with the ever-growing number of IDPs, informing fast, comprehensive and effective emergency response has become one of IOM’s top priorities.

In 2013, IOM conducted no less than five thematic studies among IDPs in Iraq. Carried out in the developmental framework of the Community Revitalization Programme II (CRP II) the studies assessed the barriers to IDP socio-economic integration, problems of IDP youth in integrating in secondary education, the lives of displaced women, the success of IDP micro-enterprises and the community level impact of the Syria crisis.

The original thematic study on new displacements aimed to examine the issues specific to: firstly, those displaced in 2013 following attacks and threats against ethnic minorities, such as Turkmen and Shabak in Ninawa and Salah al-Din, also some small-
scale displacements in Baghdad, Diyala and Basra, and, secondly, the larger displacement that started due to hostilities in Anbar in the last days of 2013. In the early months of 2014, this became known as the Anbar crisis, but over the summer of 2014 the crisis became general in numerous other governorates in central and northern Iraq, specifically following the fall of Mosul and armed group offensives in the Sinjar district of Ninawa.

The study was conducted using multiple methodologies and information sources. A representative survey was carried out in three “cluster regions” of Iraq: the southern, central and central-northern regions and the KRI. In Anbar the security situation prevented the conduction of surveys, so the data was gathered through focus group discussions and interviews with selected key informants. IOM’s RARTs conducted this field research throughout April and May 2014, and as the situation has transformed in much of the country, IOM’s DTM findings have been included to ensure coverage of the most recent displacements. The DTM has proved to be an extremely useful tool not only for IOM, but also the United Nations Country Team in Iraq, having successfully documented the displacement of at least 287,572 families throughout 2014, and will continue doing so as the situation evolves.

The results of the survey and focus group discussions indicated intentions familiar from earlier research, namely the desire to return to the areas of origin; however, over the years of displacement and depending upon prevailing conditions of security, employment and accommodation, intentions begin to shift toward integration in the area of displacement.¹

The research results convey a picture of distress and vulnerability that varies by region, combined with the relative advantages of the chosen area of displacement; however, the main intention of nearly all, at the time of the research, was to return to their area of origin: “I will live in a tent where my house was destroyed,” said a female IDP from Anbar residing in Ninawa.

Following access to IOM’s DTM, a new goal included in this report is to update and document the latest developments of new displacement up to September 2014.

To put the current displacement into historical perspective, Chapter 1 outlines the preceding waves of displacement in Iraq since the early 1980s. Chapter 2 explains the methodology; the two following chapters are dedicated to reporting the findings of the field research among IDPs and a limited number of other key informants: Chapter 3 reports on the patterns of displacement, while Chapter 4 is dedicated to reporting on the living conditions, vulnerabilities and most pressing needs of those displaced in 2013 and 2014. Chapter 5 summarizes and analyses the findings, also discussing regional differences and profiles of the displaced and their particular needs.

¹. Barriers to Integration, IOM Iraq, November 2013
CHAPTER 1
A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
THREE WAVES OF DISPLACEMENT BEFORE 2013

The focus of this report is on displacement in Iraq in 2013 and 2014, (amounting to over 1.7 million people by mid September 2014) and, crucially, on the assistance needs of the newly displaced. Recent events have provoked yet another wave of displacements. Before the latest increase in displacement in Iraq commencing in late 2013, experts distinguish three major waves of displacement since the late 1970s.

The first such wave, which began around the time when Saddam Hussein formally became the head of state in 1979 and lasted until 2003, resulted in an estimated one million internally displaced. A primary cause for displacement during that period was the Iran-Iraq war that persisted from 1980 to 1988, which resulted in the deaths of more than half a million people, injured another million and displaced mainly Iraqi Kurds. The genocidal al-Anfal campaign against Kurds also caused large numbers of Kurds to flee the country. The first Gulf War in 1991 forced as many as two to three million Iraqis into neighbouring countries.

The second wave came in the wake of the intervention led by the United States in 2003 that toppled Hussein's regime and marked the beginning of a period of prolonged instability, sectarian violence and the displacement of an estimated 250,000 people in the first three years. In February 2006, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shia shrines in Iraq, initiated a third wave of displacement and widespread sectarian violence. Between 2006 and 2008, some 1.6 million people were displaced due mostly to sectarian violence and persecution of minorities, making this third wave the most dramatic and substantial of the first decade of this millennium. An additional estimated 1.8 million Iraqis became refugees between 2003 and 2007, many fleeing to Syria, Jordan and other neighbouring countries.

These three waves covered multiple-year displacement periods of many millions of Iraqis, both within their country and abroad. During the following period of relative calm (2008-2012) many IDPs returned to their areas of origin, whereas others continued efforts to integrate in their area of displacement. Although both groups have received financial and other support from the Iraqi Government and international organizations, large numbers still suffer the consequences of their original displacement and face challenges to achieving durable solutions. In spite of this support, prolonged internal displacement of very large numbers of Iraqis was still a reality when the security situation in the country started to deteriorate again in late 2013.

2. Ibid.
3. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/05/lessons-america-first-war-iran-riedel
5. Barriers to Integration, IOM, November 2013.
7. Traditionally, UNHCR has advocated 3 durable solutions: repatriations, resettlement and local integration. For more information see http://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/IASC%20Framework%20DS%20for%20IDPs.pdf
Security began stabilizing in Iraq after 2008 and displacement steadily dropped until 2013, when an estimated 9,991 individuals were displaced. These displacements were concentrated in Ninawa, Baghdad, Basra and Diyala, the Shabak and Turkmen ethnic minorities comprising a large proportion of the displaced.

Hundreds of Turkmen families in Ninawa, the Toz-Kharmato district of Salah al-Din and Diyala Governorate began moving in September 2013, many citing direct threats as the cause. Karbala and Najaf were the most common destinations for displaced Turkmen. The Shabak, on the other hand, moved within Ninawa, fleeing from the Mosul area into nearby villages.

In addition to direct threats and targeting of minorities, in 2013 there was also significant displacement due to generalized violence and insecurity in Baghdad and Diyala. At the very end of 2013, the security situation worsened dramatically and then deteriorated into the so-called Anbar crisis. Further escalation of hostilities and generalized violence has spread to several other governorates throughout the spring and summer of 2014, causing the highest incidence of displacement since the period between 2006 and 2008.

Three major events have initiated displacement in 2014: violence that originally erupted in the western Anbar Governorate, the lightning offensive of armed groups on Mosul city that also affected the central Governorates of Salah al-Din and Diyala and lastly the offensive in the Sinjar district of Ninawa Governorate that largely targeted minority, non-Sunni groups. Since the beginning of June, more than 1.25 million Iraqis have been forced from their homes, creating an intensive humanitarian emergency and demonstrating that yet another prolonged IDP crisis lies ahead.

### TIMELINE OF DISPLACEMENT SINCE 2013

- **AUGUST 2013**: Shabak in Ninawa receive threats; displace within Ninawa
- **19 SEPTEMBER 2013**: Displacement to Karbala and Najaf due to direct threats and violence. Majority are Turkmen Shia. Also displacement of Sa’adoun tribe of Basrah to Salah al-Din.
- **OCTOBER 2013**: Iraqi forces raid camp in Anbar suspected of sheltering Sunni armed groups. (AG), Clashes between government forces and armed groups begin.
- **31 OCTOBER 2013**: Flooding in Abu Ghraib district after AG seized dam displaces thousands
- **31 DECEMBER 2013**:
- **20 MARCH 2014**:
- **20 APRIL 2014**:
- **27 APRIL 2014**:
ANBAR CRISIS

On 30 December 2013, clashes broke out in Ramadi, the capital of the Anbar Governorate, after Iraqi government forces stormed a protest camp suspected of sheltering Sunni insurgents. The campaign resulted in numerous deaths of the targeted armed insurgent groups, but also caused thousands of families to flee their homes. Like the 2006 Samarra bombing mentioned above, this incident is widely regarded as a trigger to the current crisis.

As of October 2013, only 2 families had been identified by IOM as displaced from Anbar during that year;11 by September 2014, IOM’s RART field staff had identified 82,621 families (approximately 495,726 individuals) who had been displaced to various locations from the Anbar Governorate alone.12 It is estimated that approximately 54,959 of these families were displaced to other locations within the Governorate, while the remaining 27,662 were displaced to other governorates in Iraq, primarily Baghdad, the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk.13

Historically, Anbar has been a strategically important, highly disputed area largely under tribal control. An almost entirely Sunni region, the citizens of Anbar constituted a large support base for Saddam Hussein’s regime and during the 2003 United States-led intervention it served as a stronghold for al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents. The subsequent shift in power from a Sunni to a Shia majority government in Iraq and the economic difficulties resulting from the invasion left many Anbar citizens feeling marginalized. In 2006, violence in Anbar reached a peak and provoked the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Anbar citizens.14

2008 saw the advent of the “Sunni Awakening”, where Anbar tribal leaders aligned with United States forces to combat armed insurgents. After the gradual reduction of violent incidents in the Governorate, thousands of Anbar families returned to their homes;15 however, the 2011 transfer of security control to government forces...
has further exacerbated tensions between the Government, tribal groups and foreign fighters; the Anbar Governorate has been a crucial strategic territory for primarily Sunni armed militias aiming to destabilize the Government. The same armed groups are active in both Syria and Iraq and have made it clear that they aim to subject both countries to the same centralized leadership. As the conflict in Syria rages on and targeted attacks continue to destabilize Iraq, the two conflicts appear to be inseparable parts of a regional crisis.

MOSUL CRISIS

On 10 June 2014, another wave of displacement began when armed groups seized control of Mosul, capital of the Ninawa Governorate, and Iraq’s second largest city, located along Iraq’s north-western Syrian border. Ninawa is a predominantly Sunni Governorate with a population of 3.2 million. It has also historically been home to the vast majority of Iraq’s minority groups, such as the Kurdish Yazidis, Shia Turkmen, Shabak and Christians, many of whom have fled in recent years under threats and the instability of the region and the country.

In the summer of 2014, thousands of members of these groups were displaced from their homes in Ninawa. Direct threats to minorities and clashes between armed groups and Iraqi Security Forces with Kurdish Peshmerga troops have been the major causes of displacement after June: for example, in mid-July, Islamist insurgents issued a statement that Iraqi Christians must “convert, pay taxes, or be killed” by 19 July, igniting large-scale Christian displacement toward the KRI.

According to IOM’s DTM, an estimated 207,054 individuals were displaced from Ninawa in June and July alone. Displacements due to the Mosul crisis consisted largely of ethnic and religious minorities, such as Christians, Kurdish Yazidis and Shia Turkmen, with a clear pattern of Yazidis and Christians moving toward the KRI and Shia Turkmen moving toward the central and southern districts, namely Karbala and Najaf.

THE SINJAR OFFENSIVE

August witnessed further persecution of Ninawa’s minority groups. After an armed group offensive in the Sinjar district in early August, tens of thousands of Kurdish Yazidis were forced from their homes. While an initial wave of Yazidis fled along the Syrian border, many sought refuge in the nearby Sinjar mountain range where they were surrounded by armed groups, facing death and starvation. On 4 August, a humanitarian corridor to the Syrian border was opened under the protection of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. By 13 August, the vast majority of Yazidis had been

19. Figures based on August 2014 DTM
evacuated via the corridor and crossed back into Iraq’s northernmost Dohuk Governorate of the KRI via the Peshkhabour border crossing.

In August alone, 643,932 individuals were displaced from Ninawa, 60 per cent of whom went to Dohuk, others to Erbil and Karbala, while a large proportion was also displaced within Ninawa.

This population exists in a highly vulnerable state of emergency, with huge numbers of IDPs in Dohuk and Ninawa living in abandoned buildings, public spaces, schools, transit camps and informal settlements. Those living in vulnerable shelters are highly subject to secondary displacement, as are those who are exhausting their savings to pay rent.

FEATURES OF DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ

While the extent and geographical features of the latest displacements are documented and estimated with sound statistical accuracy, estimates for total IDPs in Iraq vary widely, due to various factors, including differences in the criteria used to determine who is considered an IDP, failure of IDPs to register with local authorities or the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement, lack of reliable information often due to restrictive security conditions, the fluid nature of displacement itself, characterized by constant cycles of displacement and return, and lastly, the difficulties of conducting IDP assessments in regions that are theatres of conflict.

Iraqi Government figures on 4 May 2014 placed total IDP figures at around 650,000 and estimates from international NGOs indicate there may have been up to 2.1 million. Accounting for the massive displacement of 2014, at mid-September this number could easily surpass three million.

In July 2014, while commenting on the latest violent developments in Iraq, Ferris and Federici (2014) stated: “More than one million Iraqis displaced by violence in 2006-08 have yet to find lasting solutions. Repeated crises have created layers of displacement within Iraq.”

The spreading conflict and violence, especially in 2014, have not only contributed to the creation of a several new and massive layers of people in urgent need and distress, but has also added to the vulnerability of the millions of previously displaced.

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20. Iraq Ministry of Migration and Displacement statistic from 4 May 2014
21. IDMC Annual Report 2014 combined with IOM DTM estimates for 2014 displacements
This chapter briefly reviews the methodology applied in this study, where the main source of information was a field survey among IDP households in three regional clusters. The survey data produced material for quantitative analysis, which was complemented with a limited number of focus group discussions and key informant interviews that produced data for qualitative analysis. Both quantitative survey data and the qualitative element were conducted by IOM’s RARTs in their respective governorates.

Due to the deteriorating security situation in the Anbar Governorate at the time of the data collection in April and May 2014, the local RARTs could not perform the household survey among IDPs, but were able to conduct focus group discussions and key informant interviews. As the crisis in Iraq escalated steeply, especially in the summer months of 2014, the above sources were complemented with data collected through DTM, IOM’s regular IDP monitoring tool.
TARGET POPULATION

New Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq

As stated above, this study focuses on the new displacements in Iraq. This term refers to individuals and families who were displaced in the years 2013 and 2014. This new wave of displacement in Iraq has grown significantly, especially in 2014. As this study was finalized in September, the most recent data taken from IOM’s DTM dates from 15 September 2014.

The study focuses on persons displaced in Iraq during the year 2013, totalling around 1,865 families, and those who were displaced during the first four months of 2014. It also addresses the massive displacement that occurred in throughout the summer, up until mid-September. At the time of the field data collection in April and May, IOM’s country-wide DTM informant system had registered 79,810 displaced families due to the Anbar crisis, comprising altogether an estimated 478,860 individuals; however, widespread clashes and violence of extremist groups throughout the summer of 2014 caused further waves of displacement across Iraq, especially in northern and central Iraq. By mid-September, IOM had identified over 1.7 million IDPs from 2014 alone.

Geographic coverage

Assessments of newly displaced households were carried out in three regional clusters covering 16 of Iraq’s 18 Governorates, excluding Muthanna and Anbar. Muthanna did not have an IDP population large enough to be included in the sample; due to poor security, Anbar was considered too unsafe to perform household assessments.

Profiling of the target population and sampling

Iraqi Governorates were clustered into the three main regions in the following way:

Kurdistan Region of Iraq:
This northern region consists of the three Governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniah. The KRI is an ethnically Kurdish and Sunni region with a semi-autonomous government. It enjoys not only comparatively more job opportunities and better infrastructure, but also stable security, which has made the region an attractive destination for many IDP groups.

Central and Central-northern Region:
The region covers the Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninawa, Kirkuk, Salah Al Din, Babylon, Karbala, Qadisiyah and Wassit Governorates. The central region of Iraq has nearly equal sized populations of Arab Sunni and Arab Shia, with some governorates containing solidly Sunni or Shia populations, with others that are mixed and have various small religious and ethnic minority groups. This region has proved vulnerable to armed conflicts and has experienced numerous displacement waves over the past decade.

South:
This region comprises Basra, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf and Thi-Qar. These Governorates are more secure than the central region and enjoy relative ethnic and religious homogeneity, the majority being Arab Shia.
As population density varies greatly within a region, stratified sampling of locations aimed to ensure that estimates can be made with equal accuracy in different parts of the region and that comparisons of regions can be made with equal statistical power.

Table X: Methods of data collection by regional cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONAL BREAKDOWN</th>
<th>DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central and Central-northern Governorates: Babylon,</td>
<td>1,124 Household Questionnaire assessments, 11 Focus Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Karbala, Qadisiyah,</td>
<td>Discussions, DTM assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Iraq: Thi-Qar, Missan, Basra, Najaf</td>
<td>192 Household Questionnaire assessments, 4 Focus Group Discussions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DTM assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>693 Household Questionnaire assessments, DTM assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar governorate</td>
<td>16 Key Informant interviews, 10 Focus Group Discussions, DTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assessments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

1. Quantitative data

IDP household surveys were carried out using questionnaires developed to capture demographic data on the new IDPs: their displacement, living conditions and economic situations, also to map out their particular vulnerabilities, most urgent needs and intentions for the future.

IOM Iraq RARTs developed baselines of displacement data before identifying the representative locations and households. The teams then collected information on IDP populations and their locations from various sources, namely the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement, local councils within the Governorates, community leaders and mukhtars of villages and neighbourhoods, NGOs and other civil society actors.

The baseline data was collected in February 2014 and formed the basis for the random sampling of 2,009 IDP households in 289 locations, with 693 IDP households in the KRI, 1,124 in the central and central-northern region and 192 households in southern and central-southern region, totalling 2,009 households in 16 Governorates.

Stratified sampling was used to determine a representative sample of the new IDP population, and 289 locations were identified from the covered geographic clusters; with 95 per cent confidence level and 5 per cent margin of error, the sample is statistically significant to represent IDPs in Iraq and within the three identified regions.

2. Qualitative data collection

Focus Group Discussions: Focus group discussions among IDPs were arranged in selected locations of different types of IDP settlements. The participants of the sample were selected by a maximum variation sampling technique for qualitative studies that selects study units that represent a wide range of variation in dimensions of interest. In this case, respondents were selected based on
region and shelter type, as both of these indicators have been known to have significant impact on the overall situation for IDPs due to variations in security, ethno-sectarian compositions and economic situations in these regions. Different shelter types are often connected to specific vulnerabilities, such as access to services, health care and financial situation. When possible, both men and women participated; otherwise focus group discussions were conducted with men and women separately.

As security conditions in Anbar did not permit household surveys, 10 focus group discussions were arranged in five different districts in the province: Ana, Fallujah, Al-Khaldiya, Hadith, Heet and Ramadi. As with key informant interviews, these discussions were structured to capture the differences in shelter types. Unlike the key informant interviews, however, focus group discussions participants were exclusively from the IDP communities. In Anbar, the IDP locations and IDP participants represent a variety of different shelters, as shown in Table X.

### Table X: Focus Group Discussions conducted in Anbar governorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHELTER TYPE</th>
<th>DISTRICT(S) - M</th>
<th># FGD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host family</td>
<td>Heet</td>
<td>1M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented housing</td>
<td>Hadith, Ana</td>
<td>2M 1F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>1M 1F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public complexes</td>
<td>Ramadi</td>
<td>2M 2F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key informants interviewed were mostly community leaders or representatives. In this study, some IDPs were also interviewed as key informants with similar semi-structured questionnaires as the key informants representing host communities. The key informant interviews mainly produced data for qualitative analysis. Interviews of key informants in the Anbar province were conducted in eight different locations with one IDP representative and one member of the host community in each, totalling 16 interviews.

### 3. Secondary data

Displacement Tracking Matrix is an information management tool developed by IOM to gather baseline information on displaced populations and conditions in areas of temporary settlement. DTM was also used in the analysis of new displacement patterns, especially for those who displaced in 2014. The process of identifying, validating, and assessing locations is cyclical, and designed to effectively track the continued movements and trends of displaced populations at the location and governorate level, as the situation evolves.

As displacement in Iraq has continued evolving, so has the DTM. An adaptable tool, the DTM “plus” was developed in order to adapt to the deteriorated security situation while quickly and frequently producing basic information about displacement as well as the most basic needs of newly displaced IDPs. Since it provides timely and fast information about the locations and needs of new IDPs, DTM plus has proved to be immensely important to informing the large scale emergency response projects of IOM as well as many other UN organizations that are currently underway in Iraq.

Data from the DTM published in the end of May 2014 is used to describe IDPs who displaced from Anbar before the escalation of the crisis in June in central and north central Iraq. The DTM data from September 15 represents data for displacements occurring due to the ongoing central Iraq crisis that began to escalate in June.
CHAPTER 2 | METHODOLOGY

IOM’S DISPLACEMENT TRACKING INFRASTRUCTURE

Under the Community Revitalization Programme Phase III (CRP III), funded by the United States of America State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, IOM Iraq is responsible for continual monitoring of emergency and humanitarian needs among vulnerable populations across Iraq, rapid response recommendations, publication of targeted thematic and geographic assessments and production of specific reports.

Sixty staff of the RART network deployed in all 18 governorates across Iraq accomplished the data collection for this thematic report. The RARTs are trained and equipped to carry out rapid individual assessments, community assessments and information collection and analysis to produce preliminary recommendations for Community Assistance Projects.

RARTs are also trained in rapid assessment and response to the emergency and humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable populations regardless of their status as IDPs, returnees or host community members, most recently through conducting the DTM. Since 2003, IOM has assessed and monitored the movements, needs, living conditions and intentions of populations throughout Iraq. These assessments provide valuable qualitative and quantitative data and information about IDP and returnee needs, which is compiled, processed and analysed for public distribution to government officials, humanitarian actors including UN Country Team member agencies in Iraq and partner NGOs, think tanks, media outlets, academic institutions and other key stakeholders. IOM’s RARTs also contribute data regularly to the Interagency Information Analysis Unit, to allow the UN Country Team in Iraq to coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively.

Although the research targeted the newest wave of displacement, the rapidly evolving and deteriorating situation in the following months kept changing the conditions variably in different regions of the country, creating constant waves of displacement and thus the main datasets collected in April and May 2014 represent the status at that particular moment. The results of that analysis should therefore be viewed in the context of the dynamics of the escalating crisis in Iraq during 2014.

Deteriorating security in June also interrupted focus group discussion activities, which remained limited: 15 were conducted in 8 governorates in the central and southern regions to complement the survey data and none in the KRI. The data from Anbar, collected solely through focus group discussions, clearly cannot be directly compared to the three cluster regions, where the main data source was the statistically representative survey.
CHAPTER 3
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
2013 - 2014

This chapter examines the findings of the field research and data collection, the main focus being the actual dynamics of the new displacement, as conveyed by the data collected through the field survey and the focus group discussions.
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SURVEY SAMPLE

The survey carried out for this study in April 2014 covered 2,009 households. Over a quarter, (542 households) were displaced in 2013 and the majority, (1,467 households), in the first months of 2014. As explained in Chapter 2, the regional distribution of the 2,009 households by the area of displacement reflected the spread and size of the IDP population in various parts of Iraq. Thus, 1,124 of the 2,009 households surveyed resided in the central governorates, 693 in the Kurdish Region and 192 in the southern governorates.

Sixty-five percent of all families displaced between January 2013 and April 2014 in the sample originated from Anbar Governorate, 13 per cent from Ninawa, 7 per cent from Baghdad and the rest from the Governorates of Diyala, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk. Almost nine out of 10 of the 1,467 families displaced in 2014 were Sunnis, a predictable proportion as Anbar is a predominantly Sunni governorate. Forty one per cent of the sample displaced in 2013 were from ethnic minorities such as Shabak, Kurds and Turkmen and 53 per cent were Sunni Muslim Arabs.

Almost all interviews were conducted with individuals who identified themselves as heads of their households, 79 per cent of whom were married males between the ages of 26 and 60. A small proportion of the sample, 228 head of household interviewees, were female. Also included in the sample were 128 heads of household over 61 years of age and 59 heads of household between 15 and 25 years old. Four assessments were conducted in households headed by minors.

Various gender- and health-related vulnerabilities were a significant feature in the profile of the survey sample: as many as 1,154 families, 57 per cent of the assessed IDP households, reported at least one member of their household as vulnerable. The most common vulnerability by far was chronic illness, with 543 households reporting at least one member in this category. In the field research, focus group discussion respondents confirmed that chronic illness was an overwhelming problem, because IDPs, especially in Anbar and the central governorates, were unable to get access to medical services due to security risks or insufficient staffing and supplies in the medical centres. Other reported vulnerabilities included pregnancy, physical or mental disability, recent loss of a family member or being a household headed by a minor, female or single parent.

These reported vulnerabilities differed significantly from one assessed cluster region to another: IDP households in the KRI confirmed at least one of the above vulnerabilities in 26 per cent of the cases, whereas in central Iraq 71 per cent and in southern Iraq as many as 90 per cent of the interviewed heads of household reported a vulnerable family member.

DISPLACEMENT

Displacement in the early months of 2014, before the survey was completed, related mainly to hostilities in Anbar. This was reflected in the sample of 2,009 households, of which 1,242 families were IDPs from Anbar displaced in 2014, accounting for 88 per cent of displacement between January and April 2014. On the other hand, Anbar was the area of origin for only a small proportion of 2013 displacement; 40 per cent of 2013 displacements were from Ninawa, where many ethnic and
Overall push factors

As armed conflicts and violence have destabilized Iraq over the past year, it is logical that 86 per cent of the survey respondents stated generalized violence, direct threats, ethnic or religious persecution as the most important reasons for their displacement. All members of minority groups reported at least one of these push factors and were also more likely to have received direct threats, indicative of the hostile environment minority groups in Iraq often experience. Direct threats and ethno-religious persecution remained commonly reported push factors for those displaced after June.

IDPs displaced from Anbar reported that clashes between armed groups and the Iraqi Government not only threatened their physical safety, but also destroyed their homes and property and disrupted public services such as food distribution, electricity and water supplies.

By the time of the survey, Sulaymaniya (20%), Erbil (16%) and Baghdad (16%) Governorates were the most common destinations for IDPs from Anbar who moved outside Anbar. Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Dohuk Governorates each accounted for about 8 per cent of displacements from Anbar outside Anbar.

These Governorates also remained common destinations for post-June displacements from the central and north central region of Iraq that are concentrated in the KRI Governorates: Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniah. “The area we came from has become empty because so many people have displaced due to the constant random bombings,” said an IDP from Anbar residing in Ninawa, “We don’t know where to go with the conditions we are currently experiencing.”

After the escalation of hostilities in June 2014, most Christians and Yazidis in Ninawa moved to the KRI and there was a clear pattern of Shia Turkmen moving south toward Shia-dominated areas south of Baghdad. After June, Dohuk Governorate received the single largest influx of IDPs of any governorate; between June and mid-September 2014, the IDP population of Dohuk increased to an overwhelming 442,062 individuals. 23

23. DTM 15 September 2014
In addition to Ninawa, other Iraqi governorates such as Salah al-Din and Diyala, have become subject to armed conflict and have suffered significant displacement throughout the summer of 2014; nearly 41,000 families have been displaced from Salah al-Din throughout the summer and over 12,000 displaced from Diyala. IDPs from Salah al-Din largely moved toward neighbouring Kirkuk district, as well as Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in the KRI. On the other hand, three quarters of IDPs from Diyala were displaced internally, mostly to the northern Khaanqin and Kifri districts bordering the KRI and are receiving assistance from the Kurdish Regional Government. Also noteworthy are the smaller populations of IDPs displaced from Kirkuk, Baghdad and Babylon, mostly moving within the same governorate or to the southern or central governorates.

24. Ibid

In August, Ninawa overtook Anbar as the primary Governorate of origin for 2014 IDPs, with a staggering 851,724 total IDPs having fled throughout the year. Over half of the IDPs from Ninawa went to Dohuk, the majority being Yazidis and Christians. Significant numbers also moved within Ninawa, largely to the Akre and al-Shikhan districts that share a border with Dohuk, and are being assisted by the Kurdish Regional Government. Erbil, Najaf and Karbala Governorates also host large populations of IDPs from Ninawa. Many displaced Turkmen specifically sought Karbala and Najaf as their areas of displacement.
In the south, more households reported that they had left due to direct threats than to generalized violence, a noteworthy situation, as in terms of ethno-religious composition, the IDPs in southern governorates were fairly evenly split between Sunni and Shia Arabs. Najaf Governorate hosted 127 out of 192 surveyed households in the south and continues to be by far the southern Governorate with the highest number of those displaced during the summer. The Governorate is currently establishing camps to accommodate the nearly 13,000 IDP families that have arrived since June.

IDPs in the south were moving predominantly due to direct threats to both Sunni and Shia that continued during 2013 and 2014: for example, IDPs from Anbar who participated in focus group discussions in Basra reported reasons for their departure such as having their house and property burned down, receiving threats after the death of a brother, or being threatened for working in the police force. While ethnic and religious minorities often receive direct threats, this also happens to members of majority religions and ethnicities.
PULL FACTORS

While lack of security and threats were the factors pushing people to displace, perceived stable security was the most important pull factor guiding the choice of area of displacement: 93 per cent of families interviewed gave security as the reason for moving to their current location. Factors such as access to accommodation, presence of family and friends and access to services and employment were also frequently mentioned as pull factors.

Pull factors, other than the ubiquitous security, varied slightly among the three cluster regions. In the KRI, accommodation was stated as a factor by 86 per cent of the interviewed households, far more frequently than in the other regions. IDPs displaced to the KRI after June confirmed that after security, accommodation was the second most common pull factor. In the central governorates, however, IDPs were more concerned with the presence of familiar people and traditions. Except for Ninawa, where many minority displacements occurred, the majority of IDPs in the central region were Arab Sunni Muslims who moved from Anbar or other governorates in central Iraq and were attracted to destinations with a similar ethno-sectarian composition.

Notably, the presence of a similar ethno-sectarian group was only important in the central region, where 30 per cent of IDP families who settled there listed it as a pull factor. This remained true for post-June IDPs: in Karbala, where most IDPs after June were of the Turkmen minority, freedom to practice cultural or religious traditions and the presence of similar ethno-sectarian groups actually outranked security as a pull factor.

The indicated pull factors for those displaced within Anbar were slightly different. The most common factor was security, characterized by movement to areas at least relatively more stable than those areas they had left. The second most commonly stated reason for displacement was the presence of family and friends in the area of displacement and therein the ease of integration with the host community. The third most common factor was proximity to original residences. Some IDPs said that they remained close so they could monitor the situation in their former locations, while others stated that because they did not have enough money to move outside the Anbar Governorate, they went to the nearest available place. Also notable is that after the 2006 wave of displacement, Anbar experienced a substantial wave of return. Based on similar past events and also that most IDPs from Anbar intended to return, it is reasonable to assume that in a future where security in Anbar stabilizes, it is a distinct possibility that many of these IDPs will seek to return to their homes in the Governorate.

Similarly, IDPs from Anbar who participated in a focus group discussion in Kirkuk stated that the cost of living in Kirkuk was lower than in the bordering KRI, which influenced their decision. They also reported that since many of the host community in Kirkuk had been IDPs themselves, they felt that the host community was more receptive to their presence. It appears that new IDPs tend to move to the same areas that have historically held displaced populations.

Many of the focus group participants stated that while security might not be ideal in their area of displacement, it was at least better than the area they had left. This seemed to be the case in Anbar, where many IDP communities lived in close proximity to their area of origin and the areas of

25. Review of Displacement and Return, IOM, 2010
26. As Baghdad, Ninawa and Kirkuk have historically hosted the largest total populations of IDPs Iraq-wide and at 7 August hosted 381,774 IDPs from 2014 alone; the central region has certainly experienced the most displacement for the past two decades and will probably continue to do so.
fighting, and had even attempted to return to their areas of origin or go to yet another nearby location when their area of displacement had undergone fighting or shelling.

IDPs in Anbar have continued to experience harsh conditions in their areas of displacement, including restrictions on their movement due to dangerous road conditions and blockades, severe food shortages, the destruction of service-providing entities and ongoing violence. By September 2014, IOM had identified 54,959 IDP families displaced within Anbar, accounting for 67 per cent of displacement from Anbar in 2014. The Governorate remains largely inaccessible for supply routes and aid relief services. Since violence has broken out in governorates to which many Anbar IDPs originally fled, such as Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala, it has been reported that some have begun returning to Anbar.

INTENTIONS

Previous studies conducted by IOM following large displacements show that the IDPs’ intentions to return tend to change with time. In IOM’s research conducted following the 2006 surge in sectarian violence, newly displaced IDPs indicated immediate intentions to return, whereas those displaced for a longer period gradually became more receptive to integrating in their area of displacement. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the mass displacements in 2006, 2007 and 2008, 45 per cent of IDPs intended to return to their original locations in Iraq. Four years later, only 6 per cent of IDPs assessed by IOM wished to return to their places of origin, while 85 per cent of IDPs envisaged their future integration into their host communities.

Although covering a shorter period of displacement, the findings of this study reflect a similar pattern in IDP intentions. Around 27 per cent of the total sample, 542 families, were displaced in 2013. Twenty-four per cent of the families displaced in 2013 indicated that they wanted to stay in their current locations, whereas only 5 per cent of those displaced in the early months of 2014 expressed an intention to stay; however, other factors than the time spent in displacement certainly influence short-term migration intentions, including security, employment status, presence of family and friends and ethno-religious populations in areas of both origin and displacement. A large proportion of those displaced in 2013 belonged to ethnic minorities of Iraq and had fled direct attacks and threats.

Minorities covered by the survey seemed generally more undecided than others about their migration intentions, contrary to the respective areas with Sunni, Shia or Kurdish majorities: of the 281 minority families, half were undecided, 40 per cent intended to return and 10 per cent intended to stay. All but one of the 15 Turkmen families, the majority of Kurdish families surveyed, and 11 of the 12 Chaldean families intended to stay in their area of displacement; however, of the 138 displaced Shabak families, 84 per cent were undecided and the remainder intended to stay. Almost all Shabak families were displaced within Ninawa.

As with findings of previous studies, security was the major determining factor in an IDP family’s intentions either to integrate or to return to its

27. Barriers to Integration | IOM thematic study, 2013
previous location. Though security is the most influential factor, it seems likely that the ethno-sectarian composition of the community in either location influences an IDP’s sense of security.

In the south, just 11 per cent of Sunni Arabs intended to stay, whereas nearly 40 per cent of Shia intended to stay and 32 per cent were undecided. Sunni Arabs appeared more intent on going back: 75 per cent intended to return. This remains true for the large number of primarily Turkmen Shia IDPs who moved to Najaf throughout the summer: the majority intended to integrate locally.

Similarly, in the central Governorates 79 per cent of Shia Arabs intended to stay, whereas only 26 per cent of Sunnis had such intentions. In 2013, 179 Sunni heads of household were displaced and 59 per cent intended to stay, implying that length of time spent as an IDP may be more influential in a family’s migration intentions than shared religion or ethnicity.

In the KRI, which had no Shia Arabs (of the KRI sample, only 2 were Shia and they were Kurdish), 493 of the 616 Sunnis intended to return and only 54 intended to stay, with the rest undecided.

Employment also influenced migration intentions: just 12 per cent of unemployed IDPs intended to stay in their current locations, whereas 40 per cent of IDPs who had some form of employment expressed an intention to stay. Two hundred and ninety-one of the 677 heads of household (43%) who were employed as daily paid workers in their area of displacement said they wanted to stay, much higher than the 25 per cent national average.
CHAPTER 4
LIVING CONDITIONS
OF THE NEW IDPs
The survey and the focus group discussions revealed large variations in housing conditions among different regions of Iraq, but in no region had sustainable solutions been found for the newly displaced. Vulnerabilities linked to IDP housing included crowded dwellings, multiple families living in the same flat or house, sometimes one family to each room, stress of burdening relatives or unknown host families or of settling illegally, often on government-owned land, lack of access to drinking water, lack of electricity, summer heat, overburdening of sewage systems and commonly lack of money and income to pay rent. If IDPs have not secured sustainable housing they are highly vulnerable to secondary or tertiary displacements as they search for solutions.

The most common form of accommodation for new IDPs was rented housing, followed by staying with relatives or friends. Two thirds of all the IDPs covered in the survey were living in rented housing, but there was regional variance. In the KRI 88 per cent of IDPs were renting homes, whereas in the southern governorates, more were living with host families than in rented accommodation. In central Iraq, 59 per cent of IDPs were renting accommodation and 26 per cent were staying with friends or family. Excluding Anbar, where most IDPs

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29. According to a 2010 IOM report on displacement in Iraq, 71 per cent of IDPs who displaced after 2006 were renting homes.
were living with relatives, rented housing remained the most common form of accommodation for those displaced after June 2014, followed by host families and hotels or motels, though in the south, IDPs being accommodated in religious buildings was widespread, especially in Najaf Governorate where most IDPs in the south were located. Also noteworthy is that in the KRI, which experienced the largest IDP influx, IDPs living in public or abandoned buildings, schools and religious buildings had become widespread and multiple displacements common.

IDPs in rented houses were struggling to pay the rent. According to IOM’s DTM assessments in May, the average rent per month for sites outside Anbar was USD 297 per month and USD 223 within Anbar. Erbil had the highest average rent at USD 406, probably due to the influx of IDPs and the approaching holiday season. Significantly, 62 per cent of families in the KRI were relying on their savings as their main source of income and 95 per cent of this group were also currently unemployed, clearly rendering this form of accommodation unsustainable in the long term.

In the KRI most IDPs have settled in urban locations, whereas in the southern and central governorates, IDPs have settled in rural or semi-urban locations. Also, the KRI is almost completely Kurdish and Sunni, therefore the primarily Arab Sunni IDPs from Anbar would generally not have relatives to stay with in this area.

It has been seen in the past that IDPs, convinced that their displacement is short-term, will exhaust their savings on rent. When they run out of money, they must seek new forms of accommodation and are more likely to resort to vulnerable housing. The mass influx of IDPs to the KRI since June 2014 has created pressure on housing, rent and employment that can only worsen and make secondary displacement more likely.

Living with host families was the second most common form of accommodation for all governorates except Anbar, where it continues to be the most common. As of May, over half the IDPs displaced within the Anbar Governorate were living with host families, a proportion which has since risen. These respondents also indicated that IDPs in Anbar are receiving food assistance from their host families and that this was the most common form of assistance.

Nearly three quarters of IDPs in the southern governorates and 29 per cent in the central governorates were living with host families. Focus group discussion respondents in southern and central Iraq reported that multiple families were usually living together in the same small space and that though rented housing is available, it was too expensive. “We feel embarrassed and feel like we are a burden to the families whose homes we are living in and to the community, which has been providing us with continuous aid without stop,” explained a female IDP from Anbar who had moved to Ninawa.

IDPs were chiefly living in durable housing; only 212 families surveyed were living in improvised shelters, mud brick shelters, tents or other unsound accommodation. Nearly all IDPs living in non-durable shelters were in the central governorates, most commonly renting a non-durable house or flat or living with family and friends whose home was non-durable. Focus group discussion respondents confirmed that there were IDP families in Baghdad living collectively in non-durable mud dwellings and respondents in Kirkuk

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30. DTM Round 3
31. Ibid.
32. Head of Household Questionnaires
33. Durable housing is defined by UN Habitat as "housing of a permanent nature that protects against extreme climate conditions". http://www2.unhabitat.org/mediacentre/documents/sowcr2006/SOWCR%205.pdf
claimed there were cases of IDPs living in irregular structures that “have a large number of insects and don’t protect families from the summer heat”.

In addition to IDPs in non-durable housing, those who live in abandoned buildings, illegal settlements and improvised shelters are usually vulnerable because they are often forcibly evicted. There were 103 families surveyed by the Head of Household questionnaire living in particularly vulnerable housing, such as shelters in illegal settlements, public buildings, abandoned spaces and illegally occupied government property. Over 70 per cent of families living in such vulnerable housing were in the Kirkuk and Karbala Governorates; however, this figure is bound to have risen following the recent IDP influx, especially in the KRI.

In Anbar and Salah Al-Din Governorates, focus group discussion respondents reported a growing incidence of IDPs being hosted in schools, which were overcrowded: often with one family per classroom, lacking access to bathrooms and health care and experiencing tensions among families due to the close living quarters. The incidence of IDPs living in schools had significantly increased as violence had become more widespread, especially in Anbar, Dohuk and Ninawa, and will prevent children across Iraq from beginning their next year of school. The 15 September DTM indicated nearly 28,000 families living in schools across Iraq, two thirds of which were in Dohuk.34

FOOD

Food availability remained one of the most pressing and important concerns for IDPs. All Iraqis qualify for government food rations through the Public Distribution System (PDS). While recipients normally register in their own governorate, IDPs struggled to transfer their PDS entitlement to their area of displacement. Lack of a PDS card is a barrier to receiving food assistance and the system itself is not operating well for Iraqis overall, especially since violence has worsened.

The highest percentage of IDPs receiving their PDS food ration was only 17 per cent in central Iraq, with the KRI and southern governorates reporting much lower figures; however, according to focus group discussion respondents in the south and central districts, many IDPs who were accommodated with a host family benefited from assistance received by the host families.

Despite the apparent difficulties in receiving food through the PDS, food was a secondary priority, below employment, with shelter and non-food items as the next most commonly stated short-term priority needs of IDPs at the time of the April survey. In the KRI, where for the most part IDPs had to pay high rents, food appeared to be a particularly pressing concern. The dramatic influx of IDPs after June in the KRI, has undoubtedly increased food shortages in this region.

Food availability seemed to be both a logistical and financial problem for IDPs, with hostilities hampering transports and driving up prices. In Anbar and the central governorates, problems with poor housing seemed linked to lack of food. According to the DTM completed in May, nearly half (303 out of 616) of sites assessed Iraq-wide had IDPs who were unable to afford food items, with Anbar, Salah al-Din and Karbala Governorates all reporting that almost 90 per cent of sites hosting IDPs faced this difficulty.

As the numbers of IDPs have risen very steeply since June 2014, food has become an increasingly pressing issue in Iraq, stretching the stocks and logistics of the relief agencies. It has remained a very

34. 15 September DTM
critical problem in Anbar Governorate, where all IDPs displaced throughout the year have reported insufficient food. Nearly all IDPs in Sulaymaniyah, Babylon, Karbala and Wassit also reported lack of food in September, followed by significant numbers of IDPs in Salah al-Din, Diyala and Najaf.

According to the survey, reducing food intake is one of the most frequently stated coping mechanisms among IDPs. Well over half of all households reported that while food items were available, they were too expensive to buy. IDPs often resorted to eating one or two meals per day and cutting out essential parts of their diet in order to lower the cost. One female focus group discussion participant from Anbar residing in Salah Al-Din stated that her family waited until 11 a.m. to eat breakfast because it only had one or two meals a day. The highest proportion of households that reported such self-rationing was in the KRI (72% of households).

Consistent with previous research\textsuperscript{35} by IOM, food lessens in importance as a long-term priority need: only 22 per cent of IDPs surveyed by the Head of Household questionnaire overall cited it as a long-term priority. Access to education and health care rise above food in terms of importance as a long-term need as opposed to short-term needs, where these services rank far below food. As time goes on, IDPs believe that solving other problems associated with their conditions of displacement become more pressing as many believe they will be able to solve the problem of food shortages in the short term; unfortunately, this may not always be the case.

Though some IDPs in Anbar reported having received assistance from relief organizations, host communities or religious charities, this did not suffice, given the large numbers of displaced people. As violence has continued to spread throughout Iraq creating dangerous conditions on the roads, inhibiting government and UN relief operations, and cutting off agricultural areas from the urban centres, it can be expected that immediate needs for food items in Iraq will continue to increase.

\textsuperscript{35} 7 August DTM
\textsuperscript{36} 2012 IOM Annual Report
HEALTH

As witnessed repeatedly in Iraq, violent events leading to displacement put people’s lives and health at risk, as do hazards encountered during displacement. In the situation that prevailed in April 2014, large proportions of the IDP households assessed had difficulty getting access to health services in their areas of displacement, especially in the more volatile areas at the time, notably Anbar and the central governorates, where the vicinity of clashes prevented physical access to health care, stopped health centres from providing medicine and other supplies, as well as impeding movements of medical personnel.

Only half of IDP households surveyed had access to health care. In most cases, focus group discussion respondents reported that health care is available most commonly in the form of public health centres and sometimes hospitals, but that they often lacked clean facilities, enough staff, proper equipment and medicine. Escalation of hostilities in the summer of 2014 has exacerbated these problems and the growing number of displaced has overwhelmed the already stretched health facilities.

The assessed IDP families, among whom medical conditions and vulnerabilities were already frequent, also faced health hazards through lack of care for chronic illnesses, pregnancy or lactation, bad housing conditions with poor hygiene and sanitation, and lack of means to buy medicines. In fact, 32 per cent of households interviewed reported avoiding buying medication as a coping mechanism, feeling obliged to prioritize expenditure on housing and food.

Other very commonly reported trends among focus group discussion participants were high incidences of untreated chronic illnesses because IDPs could not afford medical care and the spreading of illnesses due to unsanitary living conditions. The Head of Household questionnaires confirmed that chronic illness was the most common vulnerability, with 543 families reporting at least one family member affected.

Percent of families with at least one case of the below

In southern Iraq, the survey revealed that although health care was generally available to IDPs, they could not afford to seek treatment. In Najaf, 125 out of 127 families had access to health care but, alarmingly, the May DTM showed that 19 out of 20 sites assessed in Najaf (which hosted IDPs due to the Anbar crisis) lacked adequate medical supplies or health care specifically for women.

IDPs in the KRI generally had better access to health care and stated it was a lower priority need. The May DTM indicated that most sites assessed in Erbil and Sulaymaniya had adequate public health care centres with adequate equipment; however, as the KRI has received substantial increases in IDPs throughout the summer, facilities in the region are undoubtedly strained.
Well over half of heads of household surveyed in the central region had access to health care, but many female focus group discussion participants indicated that health care for women was a particular shortcoming, as many centres lacked female staff and/or doctors specializing in women’s issues. This causes concern, as 171 of the 231 pregnant or lactating women of the sample resided in the central region and there have been multiple field reports of pregnant women in the central governorates encountering serious complications during their journey.

In Anbar, all information sources at the time of the field research in April and thereafter confirm that IDPs have severely limited access to health care due to the difficulties of physical access, lack of adequate supplies and staff and inability to transfer equipment. Focus group discussion respondents reported that health services generally exist in the communities of displacement, but the services are overburdened and lack medicine and other medical supplies. This is corroborated by the May DTM assessment, which shows that while half of sites assessed in Anbar health care centres were functioning, 96 per cent lacked proper equipment as well as adequate care for women.

Field reports from July indicate that in the growing emergency conditions many hospitals and health care centres in Anbar were no longer operating and as of August, 60 per cent of 2,014 IDPs in Anbar reported lack of access. In Ramadi, key informants reported lack of medical supplies and also that supplies could not be transferred to them because of heavy bombing, while health centres in Heet were unable to absorb the high volume of patients. Similar to IDPs’ food issues in Anbar, limited mobility and routes to and from Anbar are being cut off due to poor security, which has had great impact on IDP access to health care. Tragically, this is occurring in the Governorate where emergency health care response is arguably needed most.

SCHOOL EDUCATION

Internal displacement creates many barriers for IDP children to enrol in schools in their area of displacement. The overall school non-attendance was as high as 64 per cent for male students and 66 per cent for female students of the IDP families in the three larger regions covered, Anbar Governorate excluded. As the nationwide percentage of non-attendance is estimated at 33 per cent for males and 44 per cent for females, IDP attendance is significantly lower. IOM field research identified obstacles such as lacking documentation, distance from schools and limited family income to purchase supplies or afford transport costs, also sometimes the need for children to work in order to support their families. In Iraq, as many as 9.4 per cent percent of male children under 15 were engaged in child labour.

In the central region of Iraq, where many IDP families were residing in rural locations, the distance between home and school was a barrier to attendance, as families could not afford transport costs and felt uncomfortable allowing their children to walk long distances, especially their daughters. This is a common problem for Iraqis living in rural areas and in Anbar concern was heightened as continuing conflict has made the routes impassable.

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37. DTM August 2014.
38. Iraqi Central Organization of Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT, Iraq National Youth and Adolescent Survey 2009)
In Anbar many schools were either overcrowded with pupils, or accommodating IDP families, therefore some IDP children were directed to other schools further away, which caused many students to drop out. At least 4,000 families in Anbar are being accommodated in schools and this is also a massive problem in Dohuk and Ninawa; some schools in the KRI have even had to delay their starting date as a consequence. In places of active conflict, such as Anbar, Salah al-Din and Diyala, access to schools is prevented by security concerns.

These results support earlier research: according to a 2009 survey of Iraqi youth and adolescents, the most common reasons across Iraq for students to drop out of school were parents’ refusal, schools’ distance from home and poor financial status.

The Head of Household survey indicated that lack of documentation from a student’s previous school was the most common reason cited for non-enrolment of IDP children; however, in January 2014, the Iraqi Ministry of Education issued a regulation authorizing schools to admit IDP children without paperwork certifying previous achievement. Registration as an IDP did not appear to affect whether a child is attending school.

In the KRI, the language barrier between the primarily Arabic-speaking IDPs and the Kurdish-speaking host community further complicated school attendance: in only 57 of the 693 surveyed families, 5 per cent of families in the KRI, were the male children attending school and female attendance was slightly lower. This issue also applied to ethnically diverse Kirkuk where there were problems with the language barrier for the Arabic-speaking students who were enrolling in Kurdish- or Turkmen-speaking schools. According to focus group discussion respondents, even in designated Arabic schools, teaching was based on the dominant language of the majority of the students.

The research suggests that school-age IDP children need support to re-enrol in the areas of displacement. At the same time, the education facilities struggle to absorb high volumes of IDP students; in many communities with high numbers of IDPs, the education system becomes overloaded, chaotic and ceases to function. In the current situation of massive emergency where schools are needed as shelters, attendance has become nearly impossible in some areas for both IDPs and children of the host community. The focus group discussions revealed that many IDP children had lost interest in going to school due to family hardships and the effects of the traumas they had undergone: therefore, the schoolchildren, their families, the school facilities and staff all need material and psychosocial support, as well as alternatives to schools being used as shelters, to improve enrolment of IDP children and also host community youth.

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39. 15 September DTM
40. Field reports from September 2014
41. A student participant in a Focus Group testified that even in Arabic schools, teaching is in the Kurdish or Turkmen language, “according to the nationality of most of the students”
LIVELIHOODS

Among other challenges, displacement normally entails loss of employment and livelihood. Employment in their area of displacement for those recently displaced in Iraq was understandably a short-term priority need, as expressed by 59 per cent of all heads of household surveyed. IOM’s earlier research show that while access to work was cited as a need by 68 per cent of IDPs in 2006, by 2008 this figure had risen to 76 per cent, as decreasing generalized violence led to concerns about long-term economic security. While IDPs reported high vulnerabilities connected to access to basics such as shelter, food, water and health care, the most commonly reported need was employment to secure income and meet other needs. As time goes on and the conditions of displacement become protracted, this need becomes increasingly pressing.

Iraq currently ranks 120 of all countries in the Human Development Index and 16.6 per cent of the population lives on USD 2 or less per day. In 2012, the International Labour Organization assessed the unemployment rate in Iraq at 13.5 per cent, though many believe the actual figure to be higher. According to the World Bank, the labour force participation rate in 2012 was as high as 70 per cent for men (much higher than the 43% reported for 2006) and only 15 per cent for women. While the GDP had been rising between 2009 and 2012, it has fallen significantly since 2013, indicating general instability in the country.

Many focus group discussion respondents acknowledged concerns that their host community was struggling with unemployment before IDPs arrived. The general dire economic situation, combined with growing internal instability, consequently made it particularly difficult for IDPs to find work.

Only 102 out of the total 2,009 heads of household had been unemployed in their area of origin, although most of those with work had not been fully employed. About one third of IDP heads of household in the KRI reported having been employed full-time before displacement, but this figure was as low as 7 per cent for the central governorates and 22 per cent in the south, indicating also that those who fled to the Kurdish Region were more likely to have had stable income before their displacement.

Currently, the overall level of unemployment in the areas of displacement among heads of household was over 41 per cent; 32 per cent had partial employment and only 27 per cent were employed full-time or were self-employed. Over 57 per cent of female heads of household were unemployed, unable or unwilling to work.

Unskilled labour was by far the most common form of employment for the newly displaced surveyed, with 23 per cent of employed heads of household reporting this as their main occupation. Other common forms of employment were in agriculture, construction and skilled services.

Daily paid work was the most common form of employment for the IDPs surveyed both in their original governorates and in their area of displacement, indicating that the Iraqi market lacks sustainable jobs. Also, many IDPs reported that employment was intermittent.

42. IOM (2010): Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq
44. World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
46. Ibid.
This phenomenon occurred for a number of reasons, including discrimination against IDPs for jobs, lack of proper registration documents and the requirement to have a sponsor in the KRI Governorates. If IDPs were employed as daily workers in their area of origin, however, they were more likely to be similarly employed in their area of displacement, while those working full time were more likely to be unemployed.

In Thi-Qar, focus group discussion participants believed that employers preferred to employ members of the host community and in Basra there was fear of employing IDPs “if no one could guarantee them”. One Kirkuk IDP recounted that he had been a teacher in Anbar before displacement, but was forced to work as a labourer at half the normal wage because he was unregistered. In the focus group discussions, IDPs recognized that while work opportunities were few for the displaced, the host community itself was also suffering from unemployment before their arrival.

The KRI was the only region where daily paid labour was not the most common source of income. Four hundred and seventy-three of all heads of household reported that their main income source was their savings; 429 of these heads of household had been displaced to the KRI and of these 95 per cent were also currently unemployed. Notably, only 3 per cent of interviewees in the KRI had been unemployed in their area of origin.

Although all post-2013 IDPs are facing difficulties in finding employment, those who were displaced to the KRI appear to experience particular hardship. There are many possible reasons, one possibility concerning the Kurdish Regional Government’s system for IDP registration: the semi-autonomous regional government requires all IDPs to obtain a temporary tourist visa upon entry. If IDPs have a Kurdish sponsor, such as an employer, family member or friend, they are able to rent houses, register their children in school and work legally. Without a local sponsor, access to these services is difficult.

Another reason is the language barrier: Arabic-speaking IDPs have difficulties finding work in a predominantly Kurdish-speaking region. As more IDPs arrive in the KRI, competition for jobs has become greater. Field staff have reported many cases of secondary displacement of IDPs who came to the KRI but had to leave due to inability to meet the high cost of living.
COPING STRATEGIES & ASSISTANCE RECEIVED

In order to cope with the difficult conditions of displacement, 52 per cent of the respondents in the nationwide sample reported that they had started reducing their daily number of meals and/or buying cheaper foods. In the KRI 72 per cent of IDPs had adopted this strategy.

In Anbar, affected by severe food shortages due to disrupted transport, high prices and numerous communities hosting large numbers of IDPs, almost all focus group discussion respondents said they were reducing their food intake. Many had received food assistance from the World Food Programme and IOM, but reported that it was not sufficient. Some were seeking food assistance from charities and mosques.

Concerning housing, IDPs tended to move toward cheaper and often less comfortable accommodation as their savings run out. Other strategies were to share housing, to live with a host family, living collectively in rented houses to share the cost of rent or living in public spaces, an ever-increasing phenomenon.

Many focus group discussion respondents also mentioned going without household items or services as coping strategies. IDPs spoke of saving expenditure on furniture or cooling appliances and enduring high summer temperatures without electricity. The May DTM indicated that in more than half sites assessed, mainly in Anbar, Baghdad, Salah Al-Din and Sulaymaniyah, IDPs lacked cooking and eating utensils and had no bedding.

Another common coping mechanism was to avoid using medical care and buying medicines. In southern Iraq, both avoiding buying medication and visiting medical institutions were much more frequently mentioned than the rest of Iraq. In some parts of Anbar, such a strategy was not even thinkable because medication and treatment were unavailable even for those who could afford it, due to the siege. Reports indicate that many public health centres in Anbar remain without sufficient equipment and supplies.

Female focus group discussion participants in Anbar, Ninawa and Southern Iraq reported that they had sold gold or other valuable items to get money for their families. Some stated that they had received modest cash assistance from the Government, but in most cases IDPs were relying on the host community for shelter, food and, in some cases, cash assistance.

Regarding received assistance, 34 per cent of the interviewed families had received food items, 31 per cent benefited from financial assistance, 30 per cent had received non-food items and 22 per cent had received psychosocial support. Most assistance had been received in the south and the least in the KRI. In the south, the majority of IDPs said they had received psychosocial support, whereas only 6 per cent in the KRI and 25 per cent in central Iraq had received this form of support.

At the time of the survey, 46 per cent of IDPs in central Iraq had received non-food items assistance, 31 per cent in the south and only 6 per cent in the KRI. As more than three quarters of 2,014 IDPs assessed by the 15 September DTM cited non-food items as a need, further such support is clearly required, especially in the KRI where there has been a recent dramatic increase of IDPs.

Very few families had received livelihood assistance, although access to employment is a clear, widespread need. Soaring unemployment rates for IDPs and the generally fragile Iraqi economy indicate that support for livelihood assistance projects in accessible areas should not be overlooked as a pressing requirement.
IOM ASSISTANCES PROVIDED

IOM has been on the frontlines of assistance distributions in Iraq as the situation has developed throughout the year. Between 1 January and 13 September 2014, IOM distributed:

- Non-food items packages for 26,102 families
- 2,500 women’s dignity kits in coordination with UNFPA
- 16,685 food parcels for the World Food Programme
- 1,513 hygiene kits for UNICEF

IOM Iraq continues to monitor the situation as it develops and provide life-saving assistance for families who need it most, including those living in schools, mosques, public and abandoned buildings.

COPING MECHANISMS
The majority of IDPs stated that employment was both a long- and short-term need. An overwhelming 77 per cent of the families interviewed indicated that work was a short-term priority need, 76 per cent cited accommodation, 54 per cent reported non-food items and 42 per cent indicated food. In situations of poor security IDPs were often also suffering serious shortages of both food and key services, such as health and education.

In the long term, 82 per cent of IDP households continued to regard employment as their priority need, followed by access to services, especially education, regularizing their legal status and health care. As IDPs begin to consider remaining in their area of displacement as an option, gaining access to services such as electricity, water, sanitation, health care and education emerge as growing concerns.

The most commonly noted needs of new IDPs assessed by the DTM in recent months have consistently been food, NFIs and shelter, followed by access to income or employment. In emergency situations where large numbers of IDPs were very recently displaced, satisfying immediate, basic needs unsurprisingly takes priority.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS
The household surveys for this study were conducted in April and May 2014. The steep escalation of conflict in Iraq and consequent mass displacements immediately afterwards require the results of the field research to be seen as specific to the situation at the time of the survey and requiring interpretation against subsequent developments.

At the time of the field research, most of the interviewed heads of household and focus group discussion participants had been displaced very recently, within a few preceding months, and generally intended to return to their areas of origin. So far the escalating conflict has kept such return option out of reach.

Up to mid-September 2014, about 1.7 million people had been displaced in 2014 alone. While nearly all of those displaced in the first months of 2014 originated from the Anbar Governorate, major new displacements since June have occurred from and within the Governorates of Ninawa, Salah Al-Din and Diyala in northern and central Iraq, consisting largely of minority groups such as Shabak, Kurds, Chaldeans, Yazidis and Turkmen directly targeted by violent extremist groups.

While the majority of IDPs from Anbar were displaced to other areas within Anbar, the KRI and Baghdad were also common destinations. In the south, most IDPs were located in Najaf. Both the KRI and Najaf have received massive influxes of IDPs since June and should be highlighted as areas in particular need of support.

Security was the main reason for 93 per cent of all IDPs surveyed for choosing their current area of displacement, accommodation was the second most common pull factor, especially in the KRI, while in the central governorates, the presence of family and friends was more important. In Anbar, after security, the presence of family and friends, as well as proximity to their former residence strongly influenced IDPs' decisions to remain in the Governorate. It was also implied that remaining within Anbar was a financial decision, since displacing to further destinations would be more expensive. As the majority of IDPs from Anbar intended to return and large scale return movement to this governorate has been documented in the past, this must be anticipated in Anbar when the situation allows.

Generally, in the areas of displacement across the country, the IDP families suffered from lack of income: 71 per cent of the totality were spending their savings, borrowing from relatives or selling personal assets. Consequently, all the IDPs interviewed were deeply concerned about finding work to generate income to meet the needs of their families themselves. Throughout Iraq it was also increasingly difficult to secure food as the spread of the conflict has hampered production, transport and thus availability, all contributing to rising food prices.

These unsustainable situations were further aggravated by the health- and gender-related vulnerabilities that the survey revealed in about half the interviewed families, including chronic illness, physical or mental disability, pregnancy or lactation, having only one (and sometimes female) head of household, or having lost a family member. Other difficult conditions of displacement included: lack of income to buy medicine or food (let alone baby food); difficulty in obtaining health care, which in many areas suffered shortages of staff and supplies; and bad housing conditions.
with serious shortages of drinking water, hygiene and sanitation. As the crisis has grown, the incidence and severity of these conditions has only increased, together with the movement of IDPs to unsustainable shelter.

Despite the variations in the profile and prioritization of the newly displaced in different regions of Iraq, certain basic needs appear common to all: food, water, shelter, sanitation, health care and psychosocial support to help children return to school. As the larger proportion of the new displaced are without work, support for employment and livelihood creation in their areas of displacement are largely perceived by IDPs as a key to any durable solution. As instability and violence spread after the field research, these vulnerabilities and needs have become more acute.

This research has also added to the existing research knowledge of the multiple historical layers of displacement in Iraq and thus to overall knowledge of the structure of the whole Iraqi population still suffering from the consequences of their displacement, whether recent or years ago. Such overall knowledge of these layers and populations of displaced people should enable adaption of assistance to the needs of any of the groups that have had to flee and continuance of assistance based on known emergency needs, such as shelter, food and health care, as well as long-term needs that are largely related to livelihood.
REGIONAL FEATURES OF DISPLACEMENT AND NEEDS OF IDPS

The vulnerabilities discussed and summarized above had the following specific traits in the three cluster regions covered along with Anbar, the large western Governorate where the troubles of 2014 originated:

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Nearly all the 693 new IDP households interviewed (34.55% of the whole nationwide sample) residing in the KRI had arrived from Anbar. As these IDPs typically had no relatives in the region, almost all (88%) were renting their accommodation at high prices and thereby depleting their savings; many felt that financial assistance and shelter assistance were synonymous. After security, access to accommodation was the primary pull factor to the KRI; however, depletion of savings from paying rent led to difficulties affording other essentials, including food, which already in April and May was a serious concern, making IDPs vulnerable to secondary displacement when they are no longer able to afford the cost of living. Many IDPs in the KRI had already started to reduce their food intake as a coping mechanism.

Although the semi-autonomous KRI had received Arab IDPs from elsewhere in Iraq, the displaced faced administrative and language barriers as if they were abroad: the need for a Kurdish sponsor was a prerequisite for obtaining legal status and registration for work, which for almost all had been impossible to find. The children of IDPs were largely out of school due to administrative and language obstacles. Many schools are now being used as shelters for IDPs, further limiting children's access to education.

Unsurprisingly, the population of IDPs in the KRI regarded employment as their first priority, over half also reporting shelter as an urgent need, as they considered their expensive rented accommodation unsustainable. Field reports indicated that as early as March 2014, IDPs from Anbar, originally displaced to live in hotels in the KRI, had begun moving south into Kirkuk Governorate because of the high cost of living. Shelter in this region has become a highly contentious issue since the beginning of the summer; tens of thousands of IDPs are living in abandoned buildings, public spaces, religious buildings and schools.

A substantial number of heads of household in the KRI, where there were many reports of IDPs being unable to register, said that achieving legal status was a long-term priority need specific to the KRI. Likewise, IDPs in neighbouring Kirkuk repeatedly stated that they needed to be able to register, to facilitate finding work and enrolling their children in school. Currently and most disturbingly, almost all the new IDP children were outside the KRI education system. As so many schools are now being used to accommodate IDPs, attendance difficulties have now also spread to the host communities.

Easing of the administrative complications to facilitate employment and education, relief aid to ensure sufficient nutrition for IDPs and arrangements for more affordable housing were therefore the most salient concerns in the KRI in late spring of 2014. The fighting and violence in neighbouring Ninawa Governorate in the summer of 2014, and the hundreds of thousands of new IDPs that have sought safety in the KRI, have not only raised tensions in the region, but also turned the overall IDP situation in the KRI into a humanitarian
emergency. As the KRI still has stable security, provision of emergency shelter response as well as livelihood programming are highly achievable.

**Anbar**

Anbar still hosted almost two thirds of IDPs originating in the Governorate, who often lacked the means to move further. IDPs were avoiding costs through living with relatives and friends, in schools, public or unfinished buildings and with poor hygiene and overburdened sanitation, similar to the situations in the southern and central governorates.

IDPs within Anbar had often been displaced close to their original homes and found themselves also caught by the clashes in their area of displacement, therefore some have tried to return to their area of origin, but in many cases have found their old habitations destroyed. Thus the Anbar-based IDPs are sometimes trapped in a cycle of displacement between their area of origin and area of displacement, with security unstable everywhere.

As persisting hostilities are keeping traffic communications blocked, serious shortages of food and medical supplies have continued to add to the hardships of the displaced in the Governorate and often prevent IDP children from school enrolment.

In the view of the IDPs, employment remained a concern, but those living in areas of poor security have different, more immediate needs. Priority needs in Anbar were food, access to services, followed by non-food items. Access to municipal services, specifically electricity and drinking water was also important to IDPs, as very few sites in Anbar had water of sufficient quality for drinking.

There were multiple requests from Anbar residents for mobile health clinics for treatment and care for IDPs. Other health care related requests were for vaccines for children and treatments for skin diseases. Many IDPs felt that the government should provide financial assistance to help cover the cost of rent and families that had been affected by the conflict should receive financial restitution. Commonly requested non-food items were furniture, clothing, cooking utensils and cleaning materials.

**Central-central northern governorates of Iraq**

The central parts of Iraq have long hosted the greatest numbers of internally displaced, which is the case also with the new displaced population. Thus 55.85 per cent (1,124 IDP households) of the survey sample resided in the central governorates. The central parts of Iraq, including Baghdad and its surroundings, have in the last decades been volatile and insecure, partly because the population comprises multiple ethnicities and religious groups. Ninawa Governorate in central-northern Iraq was the area of origin for the majority of displaced ethnic and religious minorities and in the summer of 2014, experienced displacement of these groups on a massive scale. The new IDPs residing in the central and central-northern governorates were generally poor, dwelling in crowded housing with relatives, suffering from unemployment, poor to access to food and low participation of children in school education.

Shelter was thus a more prevalent (88%) short-term priority in central and central-northern Iraq.
than in other regions. Focus group discussions revealed particular distress among IDP families living in incomplete buildings in Kirkuk and those living in schools in Salah al-Din, both of which shelter types have become far more prevalent throughout the summer.

In central Iraq, health care was stated as a priority long-term need more frequently than in the other regions. Other particular service needs included transport for children to distant schools, clean drinking water, electricity and generators. The DTM has confirmed that even if IDPs have access to functioning health centres, these often lack medical supplies and qualified personnel; therefore, health centres require material support and training.

Southern Governorates

In this region there was a relatively smaller IDP population in the spring of 2014, the proportionately comparable sample in the southern governorates consisting of only 192 households, representing 9.6 per cent of the whole nationwide sample. The majority of IDPs in the south (and also of the sample), resided in the Najaf Governorate. This remains true for IDPs displaced after June; Najaf is the southern Governorate that has received by far the largest increase of IDPs, many of whom intend to stay.

Contrary to using savings to rent accommodation as is the most typical situation in the north, the overall IDP situation in the south was more vulnerable and poor at the outset. To avoid housing costs, IDPs predominantly lived with their relatives, often crowded and uncomfortable, but benefiting from food support from host families.

High unemployment, lack of income and high food prices led to nutrition being a priority concern. Equally, the overwhelming lack of income created severe obstacles to school attendance for IDP children, and poor access to necessary health care and medication. Reducing food intake and refraining from any health care were frequently stated as coping strategies. Shelter, however, ranked above others as a long-term priority in the south, with 76.5 per cent reporting this as their highest long-term need, a situation that has undoubtedly increased since the survey.

In the course of the summer of 2014, more displaced persons, especially Shias, including Turkmen Shia, have sought safety in the south (primarily in Najaf Governorate, where many are living in religious buildings), increasing the population in distress in the region.
ONGOING DISPLACEMENT
A PROFILE OF IRAQ 2013-2014

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